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Blaise Pascal The Provincial Letters The translation is that
of Rev. Dr. Thomas M’Crie D.D., Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh and was published
in New York by Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853. [Return
to book contents page] Letter II
Paris,
January 29, 1656 SIR, Just as I had sealed up my
last letter, I received a visit from our old friend M. N-. Nothing could have
happened more luckily for my curiosity; for he is thoroughly informed in the
questions of the day and is completely in the secret of the Jesuits, at whose
houses, including those of their leading men, he is a constant visitor. After
having talked over the business which brought him to my house, I asked him to
state, in a few words, what were the points in dispute between the two
parties. He immediately complied, and
informed me that the principal points were two—the first about the proximate
power, and the second about sufficient grace. I have enlightened you on the
first of these points in my former letter and shall now speak of the second. In one word, then, I found
that their difference about sufficient grace may be defined thus: The Jesuits
maintain that there is a grace given generally to all men, subject in such a
way to free-will that the will renders it efficacious or inefficacious at its
pleasure, without any additional aid from God and without wanting anything on
his part in order to act effectively; and hence they term this grace
sufficient, because it suffices of itself for action. The Jansenists, on the
other hand, will not allow that any grace is actually sufficient which is not
also efficacious; that is, that all those kinds of grace which do not
determine the will to act effectively are insufficient for action; for they
hold that a man can never act without efficacious grace. Such are the points in debate
between the Jesuits and the Jansenists; and my next object was to ascertain
the doctrine of the New Thomists. “It is rather an odd one,” he said; “they
agree with the Jesuits in admitting a sufficient grace given to all men; but
they maintain, at the same time, that no man can act with this grace alone,
but that, in order to do this, he must receive from God an efficacious grace
which really determines his will to the action, and which God does not grant
to all men.” “So that, according to this doctrine,” said I, “this grace is
sufficient without being sufficient.” “Exactly so,” he replied; “for if it
suffices, there is no need of anything more for acting; and if it does not
suffice, why—it is not sufficient.” “But,” asked I, “where, then,
is the difference between them and the Jansenists?” “They differ in this,” he
replied, “that the Dominicans have this good qualification, that they do not
refuse to say that all men have the sufficient grace.” “I understand you,”
returned I; “but they say it without thinking it; for they add that, in order
to act, we must have an efficacious grace which is not given to all,
consequently, if they agree with the Jesuits in the use of a term which has
no sense, they differ from them and coincide with the Jansenists in the
substance of the thing. That is very true, said he. “How, then,” said I, “are
the Jesuits united with them? and why do they not combat them as well as the
Jansenists, since they will always find powerful antagonists in these men,
who, by maintaining the necessity of the efficacious grace which determines
the will, will prevent them from establishing that grace which they hold to
be of itself sufficient?” “The Dominicans are too
powerful,” he replied, “and the Jesuits are too politic, to come to an open
rupture with them. The Society is content with having prevailed on them so
far as to admit the name of sufficient grace, though they understand it in
another sense; by which manoeuvre they gain this advantage, that they will
make their opinion appear untenable, as soon as they judge it proper to do
so. And this will be no difficult matter; for, let it be once granted that
all men have the sufficient graces, nothing can be more natural than to
conclude that the efficacious grace is not necessary to action—the
sufficiency of the general grace precluding the necessity of all others. By
saying sufficient we express all that is necessary for action; and it will
serve little purpose for the Dominicans to exclaim that they attach another
sense to the expression; the people, accustomed to the common acceptation of
that term, would not even listen to their explanation. Thus the Society gains
a sufficient advantage from the expression which has been adopted by the
Dominicans, without pressing them any further; and were you but acquainted
with what passed under Popes Clement VIII and Paul V, and knew how the
Society was thwarted by the Dominicans in the establishment of the sufficient
grace, you would not be surprised to find that it avoids embroiling itself in
quarrels with them and allows them to hold their own opinion, provided that of
the Society is left untouched; and more especially, when the Dominicans
countenance its doctrine, by agreeing to employ, on all public occasions, the
term sufficient grace. “The Society,” he continued,
“is quite satisfied with their complaisance. It does not insist on their
denying the necessity of efficacious grace, this would be urging them too
far. People should not tyrannize over their friends; and the Jesuits have
gained quite enough. The world is content with words; few think of searching
into the nature of things; and thus the name of sufficient grace being
adopted on both sides, though in different senses, there is nobody, except
the most subtle theologians, who ever dreams of doubting that the thing
signified by that word is held by the Jacobins as well as by the Jesuits; and
the result will show that these last are not the greatest dupes.” I acknowledged that they were
a shrewd class of people, these Jesuits; and, availing myself of his advice,
I went straight to the Jacobins, at whose gate I found one of my good
friends, a staunch Jansenist (for you must know I have got friends among all
parties), who was calling for another monk, different from him whom I was in
search of. I prevailed on him, however, after much entreaty, to accompany me,
and asked for one of my New Thomists. He was delighted to see me again. “How
now! my dear father,” I began, “it seems it is not enough that all men have a
proximate power, with which they can never act with effect; they must have
besides this a sufficient grace, with which they can act as little. Is not
that the doctrine of your school?” “It is,” said the worthy monk; “and I was
upholding it this very morning in the Sorbonne. I spoke on the point during
my whole half-hour; and, but for the sand-glass, I bade fair to have reversed
that wicked proverb, now so current in Paris: ‘He votes without speaking,
like a monk in the Sorbonne.’” “What do you mean by your half-hour and your
sand-glass?” I asked; “do they cut your speeches by a certain measure?”
“Yes,” said he, “they have done so for some days past.” “And do they oblige
you to speak for half an hour?” “No; we may speak as little as we please.”
“But not as much as you please, said I. “O what a capital regulation for the
boobies! what a blessed excuse for those who have nothing worth the saying!
But, to return to the point, father; this grace given to all men is
sufficient, is it not?” “Yes,” said he. “And yet it has no effect without
efficacious grace?” “None whatever,” he replied. “And all men have the
sufficient,” continued I, “and all have not the efficacious?” “Exactly,” said
he. “That is,” returned I, “all have enough of grace, and all have not enough
of it that is, this grace suffices, though it does not suffice—that is, it is
sufficient in name and insufficient in effect! In good sooth, father, this is
particularly subtle doctrine! Have you forgotten, since you retired to the
cloister, the meaning attached, in the world you have quitted, to the word
sufficient? don’t you remember that it includes all that is necessary for
acting? But no, you cannot have lost all recollection of it; for, to avail
myself of an illustration which will come home more vividly to your feelings,
let us suppose that you were supplied with no more than two ounces of bread
and a glass of water daily, would you be quite pleased with your prior were
he to tell you that this would be sufficient to support you, under the
pretext that, along with something else, which however, he would not give
you, you would have all that would be necessary to support you? How, then can
you allow yourselves to say that all men have sufficient grace for acting,
while you admit that there is another grace absolutely necessary to acting
which all men have not? Is it because this is an unimportant article of belief,
and you leave all men at liberty to believe that efficacious grace is
necessary or not, as they choose? Is it a matter of indifference to say, that
with sufficient grace a man may really act?” “How!” cried the good man;
“indifference! it is heresy—formal heresy. The necessity of efficacious grace
for acting effectively, is a point of faith—it is heresy to deny it.” “Where are we now?” I
exclaimed; “and which side am I to take here? If I deny the sufficient grace,
I am a Jansenist. If I admit it, as the Jesuits do, in the way of denying
that efficacious grace is necessary, I shall be a heretic, say you. And if I
admit it, as you do, in the way of maintaining the necessity of efficacious
grace, I sin against common sense, and am a blockhead, say the Jesuits. What
must I do, thus reduced to the inevitable necessity of being a blockhead, a
heretic, or a Jansenist? And what a sad pass are matters come to, if there
are none but the Jansenists who avoid coming into collision either with the
faith or with reason, and who save themselves at once from absurdity and from
error!” My Jansenist friend took this
speech as a good omen and already looked upon me as a convert. He said
nothing to me, however; but, addressing the monk: “Pray, father,” inquired
he, “what is the point on which you agree with the Jesuits?” “We agree in
this,” he replied, “that the Jesuits and we acknowledge the sufficient grace
given to all.” “But,” said the Jansenist, “there are two things in this
expression sufficient grace—there is the sound, which is only so much breath;
and there is the thing which it signifies, which is real and effectual. And,
therefore, as you are agreed with the Jesuits in regard to the word
sufficient and opposed to them as to the sense, it is apparent that you are
opposed to them in regard to the substance of that term, and that you only
agree with them as to the sound. Is this what you call acting sincerely and
cordially?” “But,” said the good man,
“what cause have you to complain, since we deceive nobody by this mode of
speaking? In our schools we openly teach that we understand it in a manner
different from the Jesuits.” “What I complain of,” returned
my friend” “is, that you do not proclaim it everywhere, that by sufficient
grace you understand the grace which is not sufficient. You are bound in
conscience, by thus altering the sense of the ordinary terms of theology, to
tell that, when you admit a sufficient grace in all men, you understand that
they have not sufficient grace in effect. All classes of persons in the world
understand the word sufficient in one and the same sense; the New Thomists
alone understand it in another sense. All the women, who form one-half of the
world, all courtiers, all military men, all magistrates, all lawyers,
merchants, artisans, the whole populace—in short, all sorts of men, except
the Dominicans, understand the word sufficient to express all that is
necessary. Scarcely any one is aware of this singular exception. It is
reported over the whole earth, simply that the Dominicans hold that all men
have the sufficient graces. What other conclusion can be drawn from this,
than that they hold that all men have all the graces necessary for action;
especially when they are seen joined in interest and intrigue with the
Jesuits, who understand the thing in that sense? Is not the uniformity of
your expressions, viewed in connection with this union of party, a manifest
indication and confirmation of the uniformity of your sentiments? “The multitude of the faithful
inquire of theologians: What is the real condition of human nature since its
corruption? St. Augustine and his disciples reply that it has no sufficient
grace until God is pleased to bestow it. Next come the Jesuits, and they say
that all have the effectually sufficient graces. The Dominicans are consulted
on this contrariety of opinion; and what course do they pursue? They unite
with the Jesuits; by this coalition they make up a majority; they secede from
those who deny these sufficient graces; they declare that all men possess
them. Who, on hearing this, would imagine anything else than that they gave
their sanction to the opinion of the Jesuits? And then they add that,
nevertheless, these said sufficient graces are perfectly useless without the
efficacious, which are not given to all! “Shall I present you with a
picture of the Church amidst these conflicting sentiments? I consider her
very like a man who, leaving his native country on a journey, is encountered
by robbers, who inflict many wounds on him and leave him half dead. He sends
for three physicians resident in the neighboring towns. The first, on probing
his wounds, pronounces them mortal and assures him that none but God can
restore to him his lost powers. The second, coming after the other, chooses
to flatter the man—tells him that he has still sufficient strength to reach
his home; and, abusing the first physician who opposed his advice, determines
upon his ruin. In this dilemma, the poor patient, observing the third medical
gentleman at a distance, stretches out his hands to him as the person who
should determine the controversy. This practitioner, on examining his wounds,
and ascertaining the opinions of the first two doctors, embraces that of the
second, and uniting with him, the two combine against the first, and being
the stronger party in number drive him from the field in disgrace. From this
proceeding, the patient naturally concludes that the last comer is of the
same opinion with the second; and, on putting the question to him, he assures
him most positively that his strength is sufficient for prosecuting his
journey. The wounded man, however, sensible of his own weakness, begs him to
explain to him how he considered him sufficient for the journey. ‘Because,’
replies his adviser, ‘you are still in possession of your legs, and legs are
the organs which naturally suffice for walking.’ ‘But,’ says the patient,
‘have I all the strength necessary to make use of my legs? for, in my present
weak condition, it humbly appears to me that they are wholly useless.’
‘Certainly you have not,’ replies the doctor; ‘you will never walk
effectively, unless God vouchsafes some extraordinary assistance to sustain
and conduct you.’ ‘What!’ exclaims the poor man, ‘do you not mean to say that
I have sufficient strength in me, so as to want for nothing to walk
effectively?’ ‘Very far from it,’ returns the physician. ‘You must, then,’
says the patient, ‘be of a different opinion from your companion there about
my real condition.’ ‘I must admit that I am,’ replies the other. “What do you suppose the
patient said to this? Why, he complained of the strange conduct and ambiguous
terms of this third physician. He censured him for taking part with the
second, to whom he was opposed in sentiment, and with whom he had only the
semblance of agreement, and for having driven away the first doctor, with
whom he in reality agreed; and, after making a trial of strength, and finding
by experience his actual weakness, he sent them both about their business,
recalled his first adviser, put himself under his care, and having, by his
advice, implored from God the strength of which he confessed his need,
obtained the mercy he sought, and, through divine help, reached his house in
peace. The worthy monk was so
confounded with this parable that he could not find words to reply. To cheer
him up a little, I said to him, in a mild tone: “But after all, my dear
father, what made you think of giving the name of sufficient to a grace which
you say it is a point of faith to believe is, in fact, insufficient?” “It is
very easy for you to talk about it,” said he. “You are an independent and
private man; I am a monk and in a community—cannot you estimate the
difference between the two cases? We depend on superiors; they depend on
others. They have promised our votes—what would you have to become of me?” We
understood the hint; and this brought to our recollection the case of his
brother monk, who, for a similar piece of indiscretion, has been exiled to
Abbeville. “But,” I resumed, “how comes
it about that your community is bound to admit this grace?” “That is another
question,” he replied. “All that I can tell you is, in one word, that our
order has defended, to the utmost of its ability, the doctrine of St. Thomas
on efficacious grace. With what ardor did it oppose, from the very
commencement, the doctrine of Molina? How did it labor to establish the
necessity of the efficacious grace of Jesus Christ? Don’t you know what
happened under Clement VIII and Paul V, and how, the former having been
prevented by death, and the latter hindered by some Italian affairs from
publishing his bull, our arms still sleep in the Vatican? But the Jesuits,
availing themselves, since the introduction of the heresy of Luther and
Calvin, of the scanty light which the people possess for discriminating
between the error of these men and the truth of the doctrine of St. Thomas,
disseminated their principles with such rapidity and success that they
became, ere long, masters of the popular belief; while we, on our part, found
ourselves in the predicament of being denounced as Calvinists and treated as
the Jansenists are at present, unless we qualified the efficacious grace
with, at least, the apparent avowal of a sufficient. In this extremity, what
better course could we have taken for saving the truth, without losing our own
credit, than by admitting the name of sufficient grace, while we denied that
it was such in effect? Such is the real history of the case.” This was spoken in such a
melancholy tone that I really began to pity the man; not so, however, my
companion. “Flatter not yourselves,” said he to the monk, “with having saved
the truth; had she not found other defenders, in your feeble hands she must
have perished. By admitting into the Church the name of her enemy, you have
admitted the enemy himself. Names are inseparable from things. If the term
sufficient grace be once established, it will be vain for you to protest that
you understand by it a grace which is not sufficient. Your protest will be
held inadmissible. Your explanation would be scouted as odious in the world,
where men speak more ingenuously about matters of infinitely less moment. The
Jesuits will gain a triumph—it will be their grace, which is sufficient in
fact, and not yours, which is only so in name, that will pass as established;
and the converse of your creed will become an article of faith.” “We will all suffer martyrdom
first,” cried the father, “rather than consent to the establishment of
sufficient grace in the sense of the Jesuits. St. Thomas, whom we have sworn
to follow even to the death, is diametrically opposed to such doctrine.” To this my friend, who took up
the matter more seriously than I did, replied: “Come now, father, your
fraternity has received an honor which it sadly abuses. It abandons that
grace which was confided to its care, and which has never been abandoned
since the creation of the world. That victorious grace, which was waited for
by the patriarchs, predicted by the prophets, introduced by Jesus Christ,
preached by St. Paul, explained by St. Augustine, the greatest of the fathers,
embraced by his followers, confirmed by St. Bernard, the last of the fathers,
supported by St. Thomas, the angel of the schools, transmitted by him to your
order, maintained by so many of your fathers, and so nobly defended by your
monks under Popes Clement and Paul—that efficacious grace, which had been
committed as a sacred deposit into your hands, that it might find, in a
sacred and everlasting order, a succession of preachers, who might proclaim
it to the end of time—is discarded and deserted for interests the most
contemptible. It is high time for other hands to arm in its quarrel. It is
time for God to raise up intrepid disciples of the Doctor of grace, who,
strangers to the entanglements of the world, will serve God for God’s sake.
Grace may not, indeed, number the Dominicans among her champions, but
champions she shall never want; for, by her own almighty energy, she creates
them for herself. She demands hearts pure and disengaged; nay, she herself
purifies and disengages them from worldly interests, incompatible with the
truths of the Gospel. Reflect seriously, on this, father; and take care that
God does not remove this candlestick from its place, leaving you in darkness
and without the crown, as a punishment for the coldness which you manifest to
a cause so important to his Church.” He might have gone on in this
strain much longer, for he was kindling as he advanced, but I interrupted him
by rising to take my leave and said: “Indeed, my dear father, had I any
influence in France, I should have it proclaimed, by sound of trumpet: ‘BE IT
KNOWN TO ALL MEN, that when the Jacobins SAY that sufficient grace is given
to all, they MEAN that all have not the grace which actually suffices!’ After
which, you might say it often as you please, but not otherwise.” And thus
ended our visit. You will perceive, therefore,
that we have here a politic sufficiency somewhat similar to proximate power.
Meanwhile I may tell you that it appears to me that both the proximate power
and this same sufficient grace may be safely doubted by anybody, provided he
is not a Jacobin. I have just
come to learn, when closing my letter, that the censure has passed. But as I
do not yet know in what terms it is worded, and as it will not be published
till the 15th of February, I shall delay writing you about it till the next
post. I am, &c. |
Blaise Pascal |
