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Blaise Pascal The Provincial Letters The translation is that
of Rev. Dr. Thomas M’Crie D.D., Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh and was published
in New York by Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853. [Return
to book contents page] Letter XIV
TO THE
REVEREND FATHERS, THE JESUITS October 23, 1656 REVEREND FATHERS, If I had merely to reply to
the three remaining charges on the subject of homicide, there would be no
need for a long discourse, and you will see them refuted presently in a few
words; but as I think it of much more importance to inspire the public with a
horror at your opinions on this subject than to justify the fidelity of my
quotations, I shall be obliged to devote the greater part of this letter to the
refutation of your maxims, to show you how far you have departed from the
sentiments of the Church and even of nature itself. The permissions of
murder, which you have granted in such a variety of cases, render it very
apparent, that you have so far forgotten the law of God, and quenched the
light of nature, as to require to be remanded to the simplest principles of
religion and of common sense. What can be a plainer dictate
of nature than that “no private individual has a right to take away the life
of another”? “So well are we taught this of ourselves,” says St. Chrysostom,
“that God, in giving the commandment not to kill, did not add as a reason
that homicide was an evil; because,” says that father, “the law supposes that
nature has taught us that truth already.” Accordingly, this commandment has
been binding on men in all ages. The Gospel has confirmed the requirement of
the law; and the Decalogue only renewed the command which man had received
from God before the law, in the person of Noah, from whom all men are
descended. On that renovation of the world, God said to the patriarch: “At
the hand of man, and at the hand of every man’s brother, will I require the
life of man. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for
man is made in the image of God.” (Gen. ix. 5, 6.) This general prohibition
deprives man of all power over the life of man. And so exclusively has the
Almighty reserved this prerogative in His own hand that, in accordance with
Christianity, which is at utter variance with the false maxims of Paganism,
man has no power even over his own life. But, as it has seemed good to His
providence to take human society under His protection, and to punish the
evil-doers that give it disturbance, He has Himself established laws for depriving
criminals of life; and thus those executions which, without this sanction,
would be punishable outrages, become, by virtue of His authority, which is
the rule of justice, praiseworthy penalties. St. Augustine takes an admirable
view of this subject. “God,” he says, “has himself qualified this general
prohibition against manslaughter, both by the laws which He has instituted
for the capital punishment of malefactors, and by the special orders which He
has sometimes issued to put to death certain individuals. And when death is
inflicted in such cases, it is not man that kills, but God, of whom man may
be considered as only the instrument, in the same way as a sword in the hand
of him that wields it. But, these instances excepted, whosoever kills incurs the
guilt of murder.” It appears, then, fathers,
that the right of taking away the life of man is the sole prerogative of God,
and that, having ordained laws for executing death on criminals, He has
deputed kings or commonwealths as the depositaries of that power—a truth
which St. Paul teaches us, when, speaking of the right which sovereigns
possess over the lives of their subjects, he deduces it from Heaven in these
words: “He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God to
execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” (Rom. 13. 4.) But as it is God who
has put this power into their hands, so He requires them to exercise it in
the same manner as He does himself; in other words, with perfect justice;
according to what St. Paul observes in the same passage: “Rulers are not a
terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou, then, not be afraid of the
power? Do that which is good: for he is the minister of God to thee for
good.” And this restriction, so far from lowering their prerogative, exalts it,
on the contrary, more than ever; for it is thus assimilated to that of God
who has no power to do evil, but is all-powerful to do good; and it is thus
distinguished from that of devils, who are impotent in that which is good,
and powerful only for evil. There is this difference only to be observed
betwixt the King of Heaven and earthly sovereigns, that God, being justice
and wisdom itself, may inflict death instantaneously on whomsoever and in
whatsoever manner He pleases; for, besides His being the sovereign Lord of
human life, it certain that He never takes it away either without cause or
without judgement, because He is as incapable of injustice as He is of error.
Earthly potentates, however, are not at liberty to act in this manner; for,
though the ministers of God, still they are but men, and not gods. They may
be misguided by evil counsels, irritated by false suspicions, transported by
passion, and hence they find themselves obliged to have recourse, in their
turn also, to human agency, and appoint magistrates in their dominions, to
whom they delegate their power, that the authority which God has bestowed on
them may be employed solely for the purpose for which they received it. I hope you understand, then,
fathers, that, to avoid the crime of murder, we must act at once by the
authority of God, and according to the justice of God; and that, when these
two conditions are not united, sin is contracted; whether it be by taking
away life with his authority, but without his justice; or by taking it away
with justice, but without his authority. From this indispensable connection
it follows, according to St. Augustine, “that he who, without proper
authority, kills a criminal, becomes a criminal himself, chiefly for this
reason, that he usurps an authority which God has not given him”; and on the
other hand, magistrates, though they possess this authority, are nevertheless
chargeable with murder, if, contrary to the laws which they are bound to
follow, they inflict death on an innocent man. Such are the principles of
public safety and tranquillity which have been admitted at all times and in
all places, and on the basis of which all legislators, sacred and profane,
from the beginning of the world, have founded their laws. Even Heathens have
never ventured to make an exception to this rule, unless in cases where there
was no other way of escaping the loss of chastity or life, when they
conceived, as Cicero tells us, “that the law itself seemed to put its weapons
into the hands of those who were placed in such an emergency.” But with this single
exception, which has nothing to do with my present purpose, that such a law
was ever enacted, authorizing or tolerating, as you have done, the practice
of putting a man to death, to atone for an insult, or to avoid the loss of
honour or property, where life is not in danger at the same time; that,
fathers, is what I deny was ever done, even by infidels. They have, on the
contrary, most expressly forbidden the practice. The law of the Twelve Tables
of Rome bore, “that it is unlawful to kill a robber in the daytime, when he
does not defend himself with arms”; which, indeed, had been prohibited long
before in the 22d chapter of Exodus. And the law Furem, in the Lex Cornelia,
which is borrowed from Ulpian, forbids the killing of robbers even by night,
if they do not put us in danger of our lives. Tell us now, fathers, what
authority you have to permit what all laws, human as well as divine, have
forbidden; and who gave Lessius a right to use the following language? “The
book of Exodus forbids the killing of thieves by day, when they do not employ
arms in their defence; and in a court of justice, punishment is inflicted on
those who kill under these circumstances. In conscience, however, no blame
can be attached to this practice, when a person is not sure of being able
otherwise to recover his stolen goods, or entertains a doubt on the subject,
as Sotus expresses it; for he is not obliged to run the risk of losing any
part of his property merely to save the life of a robber. The same privilege
extends even to clergymen.” Such extraordinary assurance! The law of Moses
punishes those who kill a thief when he does not threaten our lives, and the
law of the Gospel, according to you, will absolve them! What, fathers! has
Jesus Christ come to destroy the law, and not to fulfil it? “The civil
judge,” says Lessius, “would inflict punishment on those who should kill
under such circumstances; but no blame can be attached to the deed in
conscience.” Must we conclude, then, that the morality of Jesus Christ is
more sanguinary, and less the enemy of murder, than that of Pagans, from whom
our judges have borrowed their civil laws which condemn that crime? Do
Christians make more account of the good things of this earth, and less
account of human life, than infidels and idolaters? On what principle do you
proceed, fathers? Assuredly not upon any law that ever was enacted either by
God or man—on nothing, indeed, but this extraordinary reasoning: “The laws,”
say you, “permit us to defend ourselves against robbers, and to repel force
by force; self-defence, therefore, being permitted, it follows that murder,
without which self-defence is often impracticable, may be considered as
permitted also.” It is false, fathers, that,
because self-defence is allowed, murder may be allowed also. This barbarous
method of self-vindication lies at the root of all your errors, and has been
justly stigmatized by the Faculty of Louvain, in their censure of the
doctrine of your friend Father Lamy, as “a murderous defence—defensio
occisiva.” I maintain that the laws recognize such a wide difference between
murder and self-defence that, in those very cases in which the latter is
sanctioned, they have made a provision against murder, when the person is in
no danger of his life. Read the words, fathers, as they run in the same
passage of Cujas: “It is lawful to repulse the person who comes to invade our
property; but we are not permitted to kill him.” And again: “If any should
threaten to strike us, and not to deprive us of life, it is quite allowable
to repulse him; but it is against all law to put him to death.” Who, then, has given you a
right to say, as Molina, Reginald, Filiutius, Escobar, Lessius, and others
among you, have said, “that it is lawful to kill the man who offers to strike
us a blow”? or, “that it is lawful to take the life of one who means to
insult us, by the common consent of all the casuists,” as Lessius says. By
what authority do you, who are mere private individuals, confer upon other
private individuals, not excepting clergymen, this right of killing and
slaying? And how dare you usurp the power of life and death, which belongs
essentially to none but God, and which is the most glorious mark of sovereign
authority? These are the points that demand explanation; and yet you conceive
that you have furnished a triumphant reply to the whole, by simply remarking,
in your thirteenth Imposture, “that the value for which Molina permits us to
kill a thief, who flies without having done us any violence, is not so small
as I have said, and that it must be a much larger sum than six ducats!” How
extremely silly! Pray, fathers, where would you have the price to be fixed?
At fifteen or sixteen ducats? Do not suppose that this will produce any
abatement in my accusations. At all events, you cannot make it exceed the
value of a horse; for Lessius is clearly of opinion, “that we may lawfully
kill the thief that runs off with our horse.” But I must tell you, moreover,
that I was perfectly correct when I said that Molina estimates the value of
the thief’s life at six ducats; and, if you will not take it upon my word, we
shall refer it to an umpire to whom you cannot object. The person whom I fix
upon for this office is your own Father Reginald, who, in his explanation of
the same passage of Molina (l.28, n. 68), declares that “Molina there
determines the sum for which it is not allowable to kill at three, or four,
or five ducats.” And thus, fathers, I shall have Reginald, in addition to
Molina, to bear me out. It will be equally easy for me
to refute your fourteenth Imposture, touching Molina’s permission to “kill a
thief who offers to rob us of a crown.” This palpable fact is attested by
Escobar, who tells us “that Molina has regularly determined the sum for which
it is lawful to take away life, at one crown.” And all you have to lay to my
charge in the fourteenth Imposture is, that I have suppressed the last words
of this passage, namely, “that in this matter every one ought to study the
moderation of a just self-defence.” Why do you not complain that Escobar has
also omitted to mention these words? But how little tact you have about you!
You imagine that nobody understands what you mean by self-defence. Don’t we
know that it is to employ “a murderous defence”? You would persuade us that Molina
meant to say that if a person, in defending his crown, finds himself in
danger of his life, he is then at liberty to kill his assailant, in
self-preservation. If that were true, fathers, why should Molina say in the
same place that “in this matter he was of a contrary judgement from Carrer
and Bald,” who give permission to kill in self-preservation? I repeat,
therefore, that his plain meaning is that, provided the person can save his
crown without killing the thief, he ought not to kill him; but that, if he
cannot secure his object without shedding blood, even though he should run no
risk of his own life, as in the case of the robber being unarmed, he is
permitted to take up arms and kill the man, in order to save his crown; and
in so doing, according to him, the person does not transgress “the moderation
of a just defence.” To show you that I am in the right, just allow him to
explain himself: “One does not exceed the moderation of a just defence,” says
he, “when he takes up arms against a thief who has none, or employs weapons
which give him the advantage over his assailant. I know there are some who
are of a contrary judgement; but I do not approve of their opinion, even in
the external tribunal.” Thus, fathers, it is
unquestionable that your authors have given permission to kill in defence of
property and honour, though life should be perfectly free from danger. And it
is upon the same principle that they authorize duelling, as I have shown by a
great variety of passages from their writings, to which you have made no
reply. You have animadverted in your writings only on a single passage taken
from Father Layman, who sanctions the above practice, “when otherwise a
person would be in danger of sacrificing his fortune or his honour”; and here
you accuse me with having suppressed what he adds, “that such a case happens
very rarely.” You astonish me, fathers: these are really curious impostures
you charge me withal. You talk as if the question were whether that is a rare
case? when the real question is if, in such a case, duelling is lawful? These
are two very different questions. Layman, in the quality of a casuist, ought
to judge whether duelling is lawful in the case supposed; and he declares
that it is. We can judge without his assistance whether the case be a rare
one; and we can tell him that it is a very ordinary one. Or, if you prefer
the testimony of your good friend Diana, he will tell you that “the case is
exceedingly common.” But, be it rare or not, and let it be granted that
Layman follows in this the example of Navarre, a circumstance on which you
lay so much stress, is it not shameful that he should consent to such an
opinion as that, to preserve a false honour, it is lawful in conscience to
accept of a challenge, in the face of the edicts of all Christian states, and
of all the canons of the Church, while in support of these diabolical maxims
you can produce neither laws, nor canons, nor authorities from Scripture, or
from the fathers, nor the example of a single saint, nor, in short, anything but
the following impious synogism: “Honour is more than life; it is allowable to
kill in defence of life; therefore it is allowable to kill in defence of
honour!” What, fathers! because the depravity of men disposes them to prefer
that factitious honour before the life which God hath given them to be
devoted to his service, must they be permitted to murder one another for its
preservation? To love that honour more than life is in itself a heinous evil;
and yet this vicious passion, which, when proposed as the end of our conduct,
is enough to tarnish the holiest of actions, is considered by you capable of
sanctifying the most criminal of them! What a subversion of all
principle is here, fathers! And who does not see to what atrocious excesses
it may lead? It is obvious, indeed, that it will ultimately lead to the
commission of murder for the most trifling things imaginable, when one’s
honour is considered to be staked for their preservation—murder, I venture to
say, even for an apple! You might complain of me, fathers, for drawing
sanguinary inferences from your doctrine with a malicious intent, were I not
fortunately supported by the authority of the grave Lessius, who makes the
following observation, in number 68: “It is not allowable to take life for an
article of small value, such as for a crown or for an apple—aut pro
pomo—unless it would be deemed dishonourable to lose it. In this case, one
may recover the article, and even, if necessary, kill the aggressor, for this
is not so much defending one’s property as retrieving one’s honour.” This is
plain speaking, fathers; and, just to crown your doctrine with a maxim which
includes all the rest, allow me to quote the following from Father Hereau,
who has taken it from Lessius: “The right of self-defence extends to whatever
is necessary to protect ourselves from all injury.” What strange consequences does
this inhuman principle involve! and how imperative is the obligation laid
upon all, and especially upon those in public stations, to set their face
against it! Not the general good alone, but their own personal interest
should engage them to see well to it; for the casuists of your school whom I
have cited in my letters extend their permissions to kill far enough to reach
even them. Factious men, who dread the punishment of their outrages, which
never appear to them in a criminal light, easily persuade themselves that
they are the victims of violent oppression, and will be led to believe at the
same time, “that the right of self-defence extends to whatever is necessary
to protect themselves from all injury.” And thus, relieved from contending
against the checks of conscience, which stifle the greater number of crimes
at their birth, their only anxiety will be to surmount external obstacles. I shall say no more on this
subject, fathers; nor shall I dwell on the other murders, still more odious
and important to governments, which you sanction, and of which Lessius, in
common with many others of your authors, treats in the most unreserved
manner. It was to be wished that these horrible maxims had never found their
way out of hell; and that the devil, who is their original author, had never
discovered men sufficiently devoted to his will to publish them among
Christians. From all that I have hitherto
said, it is easy to judge what a contrariety there is betwixt the
licentiousness of your opinions and the severity of civil laws, not even
excepting those of Heathens. How much more apparent must the contrast be with
ecclesiastical laws, which must be incomparably more holy than any other,
since it is the Church alone that knows and possesses the true holiness!
Accordingly, this chaste spouse of the Son of God, who, in imitation of her
heavenly husband, can shed her own blood for others, but never the blood of
others for herself, entertains a horror at the crime of murder altogether
singular, and proportioned to the peculiar illumination which God has
vouchsafed to bestow upon her. She views man, not simply as man, but as the
image of the God whom she adores. She feels for every one of the race a holy
respect, which imparts to him, in her eyes, a venerable character, as
redeemed by an infinite price, to be made the temple of the living God. And
therefore she considers the death of a man, slain without the authority of
his Maker, not as murder only, but as sacrilege, by which she is deprived of
one of her members; for, whether he be a believer or an unbeliever, she
uniformly looks upon him, if not as one, at least as capable of becoming one,
of her own children. Such, fathers, are the holy
reasons which, ever since the time that God became man for the redemption of
men, have rendered their condition an object of such consequence to the
Church that she uniformly punishes the crime of homicide, not only as
destructive to them, but as one of the grossest outrages that can possibly be
perpetrated against God. In proof of this I shall quote some examples, not
from the idea that all the severities to which I refer ought to be kept up
(for I am aware that the Church may alter the arrangement of such exterior
discipline), but to demonstrate her immutable spirit upon this subject. The
penances which she ordains for murder may differ according to the diversity
of the times, but no change of time can ever effect an alteration of the
horror with which she regards the crime itself. For a long time the Church
refused to be reconciled, till the very hour of death, to those who had been
guilty of wilful murder, as those are to whom you give your sanction. The
celebrated Council of Ancyra adjudged them to penance during their whole
lifetime; and, subsequently, the Church deemed it an act of sufficient
indulgence to reduce that term to a great many years. But, still more
effectually to deter Christians from wilful murder, she has visited with most
severe punishment even those acts which have been committed through
inadvertence, as may be seen in St. Basil, in St. Gregory of Nyssen, and in
the decretals of Popes Zachary and Alexander II. The canons quoted by Isaac,
bishop of Langres (tr. 2. 13), “ordain seven years of penance for having
killed another in self-defence.” And we find St. Hildebert, bishop of Mans,
replying to Yves de Chartres, “that he was right in interdicting for life a
priest who had, in self-defence, killed a robber with a stone.” After this, you cannot have
the assurance to persist in saying that your decisions are agreeable to the
spirit or the canons of the Church. I defy you to show one of them that
permits us to kill solely in defence of our property (for I speak not of
cases in which one may be called upon to defend his life—se suaquae
liberando); your own authors, and, among the rest, Father Lamy, confess that
no such canon can be found. “There is no authority,” he says, “human or
divine, which gives an express permission to kill a robber who makes no
resistance.” And yet this is what you permit most expressly. I defy you to
show one of them that permits us to kill in vindication of honour, for a
buffet, for an affront, or for a slander. I defy you to show one of them that
permits the killing of witnesses, judges, or magistrates, whatever injustice
we may apprehend from them. The spirit of the church is diametrically
opposite to these seditious maxims, opening the door to insurrections to
which the mob is naturally prone enough already. She has invariably taught
her children that they ought not to render evil for evil; that they ought to
give place unto wrath; to make no resistance to violence; to give unto every
one his due—honour, tribute, submission; to obey magistrates and superiors, even
though they should be unjust, because we ought always to respect in them the
power of that God who has placed them over us. She forbids them, still more
strongly than is done by the civil law, to take justice into their own hands;
and it is in her spirit that Christian kings decline doing so in cases of
high treason, and remit the criminals charged with this grave offence into
the hands of the judges, that they may be punished according to the laws and
the forms of justice, which in this matter exhibit a contrast to your mode of
management so striking and complete that it may well make you blush for
shame. As my discourse has taken this
turn, I beg you to follow the comparison which I shall now draw between the
style in which you would dispose of your enemies, and that in which the
judges of the land dispose of criminals. Everybody knows, fathers, that no
private individual has a right to demand the death of another individual; and
that though a man should have ruined us, maimed our body, burnt our house,
murdered our father, and was prepared, moreover, to assassinate ourselves, or
ruin our character, our private demand for the death of that person would not
be listened to in a court of justice. Public officers have been appointed for
that purpose, who make the demand in the name of the king, or rather, I would
say, in the name of God. Now, do you conceive, fathers, that Christian
legislators have established this regulation out of mere show and grimace? Is
it not evident that their object was to harmonize the laws of the state with
those of the Church, and thus prevent the external practice of justice from
clashing with the sentiments which all Christians are bound to cherish in
their hearts? It is easy to see how this, which forms the commencement of a civil
process, must stagger you; its subsequent procedure absolutely overwhelms
you. Suppose then, fathers, that
these official persons have demanded the death of the man who has committed
all the above-mentioned crimes, what is to be done next? Will they instantly
plunge a dagger in his breast? No, fathers; the life of man is too important
to be thus disposed of; they go to work with more decency; the laws have
committed it, not to all sorts of persons, but exclusively to the judges,
whose probity and competency have been duly tried. And is one judge
sufficient to condemn a man to death? No; it requires seven at the very
least; and of these seven there must not be one who has been injured by the
criminal, lest his judgement should be warped or corrupted by passion. You
are aware also, fathers, that, the more effectually to secure the purity of
their minds, they devote the hours of the morning to these functions. Such is
the care taken to prepare them for the solemn action of devoting a
fellow-creature to death; in performing which they occupy the place of God,
whose ministers they are, appointed to condemn such only as have incurred his
condemnation. For the same reason, to act as
faithful administrators of the divine power of taking away human life, they
are bound to form their judgement solely according to the depositions of the
witnesses, and according to all the other forms prescribed to them; after
which they can pronounce conscientiously only according to law, and can judge
worthy of death those only whom the law condemns to that penalty. And then,
fathers, if the command of God obliges them to deliver over to punishment the
bodies of the unhappy culprits, the same divine statute binds them to look
after the interests of their guilty souls, and binds them the more to this
just because they are guilty; so that they are not delivered up to execution
till after they have been afforded the means of providing for their
consciences. All this is quite fair and innocent; and yet, such is the
abhorrence of the Church to blood that she judges those to be incapable of
ministering at her altars who have borne any share in passing or executing a
sentence of death, accompanied though it be with these religious
circumstances; from which we may easily conceive what idea the Church
entertains of murder. Such, then, being the manner
in which human life is disposed of by the legal forms of justice, let us now
see how you dispose of it. According to your modern system of legislation,
there is but one judge, and that judge is no other than the offended party.
He is at once the judge, the party, and the executioner. He himself demands
from himself the death of his enemy; he condemns him, he executes him on the
spot; and, without the least respect either for the soul or the body of his
brother, he murders and damns him for whom Jesus Christ died; and all this
for the sake of avoiding a blow on the cheek, or a slander, or an offensive
word, or some other offence of a similar nature, for which, if a magistrate,
in the exercise of legitimate authority, were condemning any to die, he would
himself be impeached; for, in such cases, the laws are very far indeed from
condemning any to death. In one word, to crown the whole of this
extravagance, the person who kills his neighbour in this style, without
authority and in the face of all law, contracts no sin and commits no
disorder, though he should be religious and even a priest! Where are we,
fathers? Are these really religious, and priests, who talk in this manner?
Are they Christians? are they Turks? are they men? or are they demons? And
are these “the mysteries revealed by the Lamb to his Society”? or are they
not rather abominations suggested by the Dragon to those who take part with
him? To come to the point, with
you, fathers, whom do you wish to be taken for?—for the children of the
Gospel, or for the enemies of the Gospel? You must be ranged either on the
one side or on the other; for there is no medium here. “He that is not with
Jesus Christ is against him.” Into these two classes all mankind are divided.
There are, according to St. Augustine, two peoples and two worlds, scattered
abroad over the earth. There is the world of the children of God, who form
one body, of which Jesus Christ is the king and the head; and there is the
world at enmity with God, of which the devil is the king and the head. Hence
Jesus Christ is called the King and God of the world, because he has
everywhere his subjects and worshippers; and hence the devil is also termed
in Scripture the prince of this world, and the god of this world, because he
has everywhere his agents and his slaves. Jesus Christ has imposed upon the
Church, which is his empire, such laws as he, in his eternal wisdom, was
pleased to ordain; and the devil has imposed on the world, which is his kingdom,
such laws as he chose to establish. Jesus Christ has associated honour with
suffering; the devil with not suffering. Jesus Christ has told those who are
smitten on the one cheek to turn the other also; and the devil has told those
who are threatened with a buffet to kill the man that would do them such an
injury. Jesus Christ pronounces those happy who share in his reproach; and
the devil declares those to be unhappy who lie under ignominy. Jesus Christ
says: Woe unto you when men shall speak well of you! and the devil says: Woe
unto those of whom the world does not speak with esteem! Judge, then, fathers, to which
of these kingdoms you belong. You have heard the language of the city of
peace, the mystical Jerusalem; and you have heard the language of the city of
confusion, which Scripture terms “the spiritual Sodom.” Which of these two
languages do you understand? which of them do you speak? Those who are on the
side of Jesus Christ have, as St. Paul teaches us, the same mind which was
also in him; and those who are the children of the devil—ex patre diabolo—who
has been a murderer from the beginning, according to the saying of Jesus
Christ, follow the maxims of the devil. Let us hear, therefore, the language
of your school. I put this question to your doctors: When a person has given
me a blow on the cheek, ought I rather to submit to the injury than kill the
offender? or may I not kill the man in order to escape the affront? Kill him
by all means—it is quite lawful! exclaim, in one breath, Lessius, Molina,
Escobar, Reginald, Filiutius, Baldelle, and other Jesuits. Is that the
language of Jesus Christ? One question more: Would I lose my honour by
tolerating a box on the ear, without killing the person that gave it? “Can
there be a doubt,” cries Escobar, “that so long as a man suffers another to
live who has given him a buffet, that man remains without honour?” Yes,
fathers, without that honour which the devil transfuses, from his own proud
spirit into that of his proud children. This is the honour which has ever
been the idol of worldly-minded men. For the preservation of this false
glory, of which the god of this world is the appropriate dispenser, they
sacrifice their lives by yielding to the madness of duelling; their honour,
by exposing themselves to ignominious punishments; and their salvation, by
involving themselves in the peril of damnation—a peril which, according to
the canons of the Church, deprives them even of Christian burial. We have
reason to thank God, however, for having enlightened the mind of our monarch
with ideas much purer than those of your theology. His edicts bearing so
severely on this subject, have not made duelling a crime—they only punish the
crime which is inseparable from duelling. He has checked, by the dread of his
rigid justice, those who were not restrained by the fear of the justice of
God; and his piety has taught him that the honour of Christians consists in
their observance of the mandates of Heaven and the rules of Christianity, and
not in the pursuit of that phantom which, airy and unsubstantial as it is,
you hold to be a legitimate apology for murder. Your murderous decisions
being thus universally detested, it is highly advisable that you should now
change your sentiments, if not from religious principle, at least from
motives of policy. Prevent, fathers, by a spontaneous condemnation of these
inhuman dogmas, the melancholy consequences which may result from them, and
for which you will be responsible. And to impress your minds with a deeper
horror at homicide, remember that the first crime of fallen man was a murder,
committed on the person of the first holy man; that the greatest crime was a
murder, perpetrated on the person of the King of saints; and that, of all
crimes, murder is the only one which involves in a common destruction the
Church and the state, nature and religion. I have just
seen the answer of your apologist to my Thirteenth Letter, but if he has
nothing better to produce in the shape of a reply to that letter, which
obviates the greater part of his objections, he will not deserve a rejoinder.
I am sorry to see him perpetually digressing from his subject, to indulge in
rancorous abuse both of the living and the dead. But, in order to gain some
credit to the stories with which you have furnished him, you should not have
made him publicly disavow a fact so notorious as that of the buffet of
Compiegne. Certain it is, fathers, from the deposition of the injured party,
that he received upon his cheek a blow from the hand of a Jesuit; and all
that your friends have been able to do for you has been to raise a doubt
whether he received the blow with the back or the palm of the hand, and to
discuss the question whether a stroke on the cheek with the back of the hand
can be properly denominated a buffet. I know not to what tribunal it belongs
to decide this point; but shall content myself, in the meantime, with
believing that it was, to say the very least, a probable buffet. This gets me
off with a safe conscience. |
Blaise Pascal |
