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Blaise Pascal
Pensées
The translation is that
of W. F. Trotter (William Finlayson) and was published in New York by Harvard
Classics, 1909-1914.
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contents page]
SECTION VI
THE PHILOSOPHERS
339. I can well conceive a man
without hands, feet, head (for it is only experience which teaches us that
the head is more necessary than feet). But I cannot conceive man without
thought; he would be a stone or a brute.
340. The arithmetical machine
produces effects which approach nearer to thought than all the actions of
animals. But it does nothing which would enable us to attribute will to it,
as to the animals.
341. The account of the pike
and frog of Liancourt. They do it always, and never otherwise, nor any other
thing showing mind.
342. If an animal did by mind
what it does by instinct, and if it spoke by mind what it speaks by instinct,
in hunting and in warning its mates that the prey is found or lost, it would
indeed also speak in regard to those things which affect it closer, as
example, “Gnaw me this cord which is wounding me, and which I cannot reach.”
343. The beak of the parrot,
which it wipes, although it is clean.
344. Instinct and reason,
marks of two natures.
345. Reason commands us far
more imperiously than a master; for in disobeying the one we are unfortunate,
and in disobeying the other we are fools.
346. Thought constitutes the
greatness of man.
347. Man is but a reed, the
most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe
need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill
him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble
than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage
which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this.
All our dignity consists,
then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time
which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the
principle of morality.
348. A thinking reed.—It is
not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my
thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe
encompasses and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the
world.
349. Immateriality of the
soul—Philosophers who have mastered their passions. What matter could do
that?
350. The Stoics.—They conclude
that what has been done once can be done always, and that, since the desire
of glory imparts some power to those whom it possesses, others can do
likewise. There are feverish movements which health cannot imitate.
Epictetus concludes that,
since there are consistent Christians, every man can easily be so.
351. Those great spiritual
efforts, which the soul sometimes assays, are things on which it does not lay
hold. It only leaps to them, not as upon a throne, for ever, but merely for
an instant.
352. The strength of a man’s
virtue must not be measured by his efforts, but by his ordinary life.
353. I do not admire the
excess of a virtue as of valour, except I see at the same time the excess of
the opposite virtue, as in Epaminondas, who had the greatest valour and the
greatest kindness. For otherwise it is not to rise, it is to fall. We do not
display greatness by going to one extreme, but in touching both at once, and
filling all the intervening space. But perhaps this is only a sudden movement
of the soul from one to the other extreme, and in fact it is ever at one
point only, as in the case of a firebrand. Be it so, but at least this
indicates agility if not expanse of soul.
354. Man’s nature is not
always to advance; it has its advances and retreats.
Fever has its cold and hot
fits; and the cold proves as well as the hot the greatness of the fire of
fever.
The discoveries of men from
age to age turn out the same. The kindness and the malice of the world in
general are the same. Plerumque gratae principibus vices.46
46 Horace, Odes, III. xxix. 13.
“Changes nearly always please the great.”
355. Continuous eloquence
wearies.
Princes and kings sometimes
play. They are not always on their thrones. They weary there. Grandeur must
be abandoned to be appreciated. Continuity in everything is unpleasant. Cold
is agreeable, that we may get warm.
Nature acts by progress, itus
et reditus. It goes and returns, then advances further, then twice as much
backwards, then more forward than ever, etc.
The tide of the sea behaves in
the same manner; and so, apparently, does the sun in its course.
356. The nourishment of the
body is little by little. Fullness of nourishment and smallness of substance.
357. When we would pursue
virtues to their extremes on either side, vices present themselves, which
insinuate themselves insensibly there, in their insensible journey towards
the infinitely little; and vices present themselves in a crowd towards the
infinitely great, so that we lose ourselves in them and no longer see virtues.
We find fault with perfection itself.
358. Man is neither angel nor
brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the
brute.
359. We do not sustain
ourselves in virtue by our own strength, but by the balancing of two opposed
vices, just as we remain upright amidst two contrary gales. Remove one of the
vices, and we fall into the other.
360. What the Stoics propose
is so difficult and foolish!
The Stoics lay down that all
those who are not at the high degree of wisdom are equally foolish and
vicious, as those who are two inches under water.
361. The sovereign good.
Dispute about the sovereign good.—Ut sis contentus temetipso et ex te
nascentibus bonis.47 There is a contradiction, for in the end they advise suicide.
Oh! What a happy life, from which we are to free ourselves as from the
plague!
47 Seneca, Epistles, xx. 8. “In
order that you are satisfied with yourself and the good that is born from
you.”
362. Ex senatus-consultis et
plebiscitis...
To ask like passages.
363. Ex senatus-consultis et
plebiscitis scelera exercentur. Seneca. 588.48
Nihil tam absurde dici potest
quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.49(2)
Quibusdam destinatis
sententiis consecrati quae non probant coguntur defendere.50(3)
Ut omnium rerum sic litterarum
quoque intemperantia laboramus.51(4)
Id maxime quemque decet, quod
est cujusque suum maxime.52(5)
Hos natura modos primum dedit.53(6)
48 Montaigne, Essays, ii. 12.
49(2) Cicero, De Divinatione,
ii. 58. “There is nothing so absurd that it has not been said by some
philosopher.”
50(3) Cicero, Disputationes
Tusculanae, ii. 2. “Devoted to certain fixed opinions, they are forced to
defend what they hardly approve.”
51(4) Seneca, Epistles, cvi. “We
suffer from an excess of literature as from an excess of anything.”
52(5) Cicero, De officiis, i.
31. “What suits each one best is what is to him the most natural.”
53(6) Virgil, The Georgics, ii.
“Nature gave them first these limits.”
Paucis opus est litteris ad
bonam mentem.54
Si quando turpe non sit, tamen
non est non turpe quum id a multitudine laudetur.55(2)
Mihi sic usus est, tibi ut
opus est facto, fac.56(3)
54 Seneca, Epistles, cvi.
“Wisdom does not demand much teaching.”
55(2) Cicero, De finibus bonorum
et malorum. “What is not shameful begins to become so when it is approved by
the multitude.”
56(3) Terence, Heauton
Timorumenos, I. i. 21. “That is how I use it; you must do as you wish.”
364. Rarum est enim ut satis
se quisque vereatur.57
Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes
deos.58(2)
Nihil turpius quam cognitioni
assertionem praecurrere.59(3)
Nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri
nescire quid nesciam.60(4)
Melius non incipient.61(5)
57 Quintillian, x. 7. “It is
rare that one sufficiently respects one’s self.”
58(2) Seneca the Elder,
Suasoriae, i. 4. “So many gods are busy around a single head.”
59(3) Cicero, Academica, i. 45.
“Nothing is more shameful than to affirm before knowing.”
60(4) Cicero, Disputationes
Tusculanae, i. 25. “I have not shame, as they do, to admit that I know not
what I do not know.”
61(5) Seneca, Epistles, lxxii.
“It is easier not to begin....
365. Thought.—All the dignity
of man consists in thought. Thought is, therefore, by its nature a wonderful
and incomparable thing. It must have strange defects to be contemptible. But
it has such, so that nothing is more ridiculous. How great it is in its
nature! How vile it is in its defects!
But what is this thought? How
foolish it is!
366. The mind of this
sovereign judge of the world is not so independent that it is not liable to
be disturbed by the first din about it. The noise of a cannon is not
necessary to hinder its thoughts; it needs only the creaking of a weathercock
or pulley. Do not wonder if at present it does not reason well; a fly is
buzzing in its ears; that is enough to render it incapable of good judgement.
If you wish it to be able to reach the truth, chase away that animal which
holds its reason in check and disturbs that powerful intellect which rules
towns and kingdoms. Here is a comical god! O ridicolosissimo eroe!
367. The power of flies; they
win battles, hinder our soul from acting, eat our body.
368. When it is said that heat
is only the motions of certain molecules, and light the conatus recedendi
which we feel, it astonishes us. What! Is pleasure only the ballet of our
spirits? We have conceived so different an idea of it! And these sensations
seem so removed from those others which we say are the same as those with
which we compare them! The sensation from the fire, that warmth which affects
us in a manner wholly different from touch, the reception of sound and light,
all this appears to us mysterious, and yet it is material like the blow of a stone.
It is true that the smallness of the spirits which enter into the pores
touches other nerves, but there are always some nerves touched.
369. Memory is necessary for
all the operations of reason.
370. Chance gives rise to
thoughts, and chance removes them; no art can keep or acquire them.
A thought has escaped me. I
wanted to write it down. I write instead that it has escaped me.
371. When I was small, I
hugged my book; and because it sometimes happened to me to... in believing I
hugged it, I doubted....
372. In writing down my
thought, it sometimes escapes me; but this makes me remember my weakness,
that I constantly forget. This is as instructive to me as my forgotten
thought; for I strive only to know my nothingness.
373. Scepticism.—I shall here
write my thoughts without order, and not perhaps in unintentional confusion;
that is true order, which will always indicate my object by its very
disorder. I should do too much honour to my subject, if I treated it with
order, since I want to show that it is incapable of it.
374. What astonishes me most
is to see that all the world is not astonished at its own weakness. Men act
seriously, and each follows his own mode of life, not because it is in fact
good to follow since it is the custom, but as if each man knew certainly
where reason and justice are. They find themselves continually deceived, and,
by a comical humility, think it is their own fault and not that of the art
which they claim always to possess. But it is well there are so many such
people in the world, who are not sceptics for the glory of scepticism, in
order to show that man is quite capable of the most extravagant opinions,
since he is capable of believing that he is not in a state of natural and
inevitable weakness, but, on the contrary, of natural wisdom.
Nothing fortifies scepticism
more than that there are some who are not sceptics; if all were so, they
would be wrong.
375. I have passed a great
part of my life believing that there was justice, and in this I was not
mistaken; for there is justice according as God has willed to reveal it to
us. But I did not take it so, and this is where I made a mistake; for I
believed that our justice was essentially just, and that I had that whereby
to know and judge of it. But I have so often found my right judgement at
fault, that at last I have come to distrust myself and then others. I have
seen changes in all nations and men, and thus, after many changes of
judgement regarding true justice, I have recognised that our nature was but
in continual change, and I have not changed since; and if I changed, I would
confirm my opinion.
The sceptic Arcesilaus, who
became a dogmatist.
376. This sect derives more
strength from its enemies than from its friends; for the weakness of man is
far more evident in those who know it not than in those who know it.
377. Discourses on humility
are a source of pride in the vain and of humility in the humble. So those on
scepticism cause believers to affirm. Few men speak humbly of humility,
chastely of chastity, few doubtingly of scepticism. We are only falsehood,
duplicity, contradiction; we both conceal and disguise ourselves from
ourselves.
378. Scepticism.—Excess, like
defect of intellect, is accused of madness. Nothing is good but mediocrity.
The majority has settled that and finds fault with him who escapes it at
whichever end. I will not oppose it. I quite consent to put there, and refuse
to be at the lower end, not because it is low, but because it is an end; for
I would likewise refuse to be placed at the top. To leave the mean is to
abandon humanity. The greatness of the human soul consists in knowing how to
preserve the mean. So far from greatness consisting in leaving it, it
consists in not leaving it.
379. It is not good to have
too much liberty. It is not good to have all one wants.
380. All good maxims are in
the world. We only need to apply them. For instance, we do not doubt that we
ought to risk our lives in defence of the public good; but for religion, no.
It is true there must be
inequality among men; but if this be conceded, the door is opened not only to
the highest power, but to the highest tyranny.
We must relax our minds a
little; but this opens the door to the greatest debauchery. Let us mark the
limits. There are no limits in things. laws would put them there, and the
mind cannot suffer it.
381. When we are too young, we
do not judge well; so, also, when we are too old. If we do not think enough,
or if we think too much on any matter, we get obstinate and infatuated with
it. If one considers one’s work immediately after having done it, one is
entirely prepossessed in its favour; by delaying too long, one can no longer
enter into the spirit of it. So with pictures seen from too far or too near;
there is but one exact point which is the true place wherefrom to look at
them: the rest are too near, too far, too high or too low. Perspective
determines that point in the art of painting. But who shall determine it in
truth and morality?
382. When all is equally
agitated, nothing appears to be agitated, as in a ship. When all tend to
debauchery, none appears to do so. He who stops draws attention to the excess
of others, like a fixed point.
383. The licentious tell men
of orderly lives that they stray from nature’s path, while they themselves
follow it; as people in a ship think those move who are on the shore. On all
sides the language is similar. We must have a fixed point in order to judge.
The harbour decides for those who are in a ship; but where shall we find a
harbour in morality?
384. Contradiction is a bad
sign of truth; several things which are certain are contradicted; several
things which are false pass without contradiction. Contradiction is not a
sign of falsity, nor the want of contradiction a sign of truth.
385. Scepticism.—Each thing
here is partly true and partly false. Essential truth is not so; it is
altogether pure and altogether true. This mixture dishonours and annihilates
it. Nothing is purely true, and thus nothing is true, meaning by that pure
truth. You will say it is true that homicide is wrong. Yes; for we know well
the wrong and the false. But what will you say is good? Chastity? I say no;
for the world would come to an end. Marriage? No; continence is better. Not
to kill? No; for lawlessness would be horrible, and the wicked would kill all
the good. To kill? No; for that destroys nature. We possess truth and
goodness only in part, and mingled with falsehood and evil.
386. If we dreamt the same
thing every night, it would affect us as much as the objects we see every
day. And if an artisan were sure to dream every night for twelve hours’
duration that he was a king, I believe he would be almost as happy as a king,
who should dream every night for twelve hours on end that he was an artisan.
If we were to dream every
night that we were pursued by enemies and harassed by these painful phantoms,
or that we passed every day in different occupations, as in making a voyage,
we should suffer almost as much as if it were real, and should fear to sleep,
as we fear to wake when we dread in fact to enter on such mishaps. And,
indeed, it would cause pretty nearly the same discomforts as the reality.
But since dreams are all
different, and each single one is diversified, what is seen in them affects
us much less than what we see when awake, because of its continuity, which is
not, however, so continuous and level as not to change too; but it changes
less abruptly, except rarely, as when we travel, and then we say, “It seems
to me I am dreaming.” For life is a dream a little less inconstant.
387. It may be that there are
true demonstrations; but this is not certain. Thus, this proves nothing else
but that it is not certain that all is uncertain, to the glory of scepticism.
388. Good sense.—They are
compelled to say, “You are not acting in good faith; we are not asleep,” etc.
How I love to see this proud reason humiliated and suppliant! For this is not
the language of a man whose right is disputed, and who defends it with the
power of armed hands. He is not foolish enough to declare that men are not
acting in good faith, but he punishes this bad faith with force.
389. Ecclesiastes shows that
man without God is in total ignorance and inevitable misery. For it is
wretched to have the wish, but not the power. Now he would be happy and
assured of some truth, and yet he can neither know, nor desire not to know.
He cannot even doubt.
390. My God! How foolish this
talk is! “Would God have made the world to damn it? Would He ask so much from
persons so weak”? etc. Scepticism is the cure for this evil, and will take
down this vanity.
391. Conversation.—Great
words: Religion, I deny it.
Conversation.—Scepticism helps
religion.
392. Against Scepticism.—...
It is, then, a strange fact that we cannot define these things without
obscuring them, while we speak of them with all assurance. We assume that all
conceive of them in the same way; but we assume it quite gratuitously, for we
have no proof of it. I see, in truth, that the same words are applied on the
same occasions, and that every time two men see a body change its place, they
both express their view of this same fact by the same word, both saying that
it has moved; and from this conformity of application we derive a strong
conviction of a conformity of ideas. But this is not absolutely or finally
convincing though there is enough to support a bet on the affirmative, since
we know that we often draw the same conclusions from different premises.
This is enough, at least, to
obscure the matter; not that it completely extinguishes the natural light
which assures us of these things. The academicians would have won. But this
dulls it and troubles the dogmatists to the glory of the sceptical crowd,
which consists in this doubtful ambiguity and in a certain doubtful dimness
from which our doubts cannot take away all the clearness, nor our own natural
lights chase away all the darkness.
393. It is a singular thing to
consider that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the
laws of God and nature, have made laws for themselves which they strictly
obey, as, for instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, robbers, heretics, etc. It
is the same with logicians. It seems that their license must be without any
limits or barriers, since they have broken through so many that are so just
and sacred.
394. All the principles of
sceptics, stoics, atheists, etc., are true. But their conclusions are false,
because the opposite principles are also true.
395. Instinct, reason.—We have
an incapacity of proof, insurmountable by all dogmatism. We have an idea of
truth, invincible to all scepticism.
396. Two things instruct man
about his whole nature; instinct and experience.
397. The greatness of man is
great in that he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself
to be miserable. It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable;
but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.
398. All these same miseries
prove man’s greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed
king.
399. We are not miserable
without feeling it. A ruined house is not miserable. Man only is miserable.
Ego vir videns.62
62 Lam. 3. 1. “I am the man that
hath seen.”
400. The greatness of man.—We
have so great an idea of the soul of man that we cannot endure being
despised, or not being esteemed by any soul; and all the happiness of men
consists in this esteem.
401. Glory.—The brutes do not
admire each other. A horse does not admire his companion. Not that there is
no rivalry between them in a race, but that is of no consequence; for, when
in the stable, the heaviest and most ill-formed does not give up his oats to
another, as men would have others do to them. Their virtue is satisfied with
itself.
402. The greatness of man even
in his lust, to have known how to extract from it a wonderful code, and to
have drawn from it a picture of benevolence.
403. Greatness.—The reasons of
effects indicate the greatness of man, in having extracted so fair an order
from lust.
404. The greatest baseness of
man is the pursuit of glory. But is the greatest mark of his excellence; for
whatever possessions he may have on earth, whatever health and essential
comfort, he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem of men. He values human
reason so highly that, whatever advantages he may have on earth, he is not
content if he is not also ranked highly in the judgement of man. This is the
finest position in the world. Nothing can turn him from that desire, which is
the most indelible quality of man’s heart.
And those who must despise
men, and put them on a level with the brutes, yet wish to be admired and
believed by men, and contradict themselves by their own feelings; their
nature, which is stronger than all, convincing them of the greatness of man
more forcibly than reason convinces them of their baseness.
405. Contradiction.—Pride
counterbalancing all miseries. Man either hides his miseries, or, if he
disclose them, glories in knowing them.
406. Pride counterbalances and
takes away all miseries. Here is a strange monster and a very plain
aberration. He is fallen from his place and is anxiously seeking it. This is
what all men do. Let us see who will have found it.
407. When malice has reason on
its side, it becomes proud and parades reason in all its splendour. When
austerity or stern choice has not arrived at the true good and must needs
return to follow nature, it becomes proud by reason of this return.
408. Evil is easy, and has infinite
forms; good is almost unique. But a certain kind of evil is as difficult to
find as what we call good; and often on this account such particular evil
gets passed off as good. An extraordinary greatness of soul is needed in
order to attain to it as well as to good.
409. The greatness of man.—The
greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness.
For what in animals is nature, we call in man wretchedness, by which we
recognise that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from
a better nature which once was his.
For who is unhappy at not
being a king, except a deposed king? Was Paulus Aemilius unhappy at being no
longer consul? On the contrary, everybody thought him happy in having been
consul, because the office could only be held for a time. But men thought
Perseus so unhappy in being no longer king, because the condition of kingship
implied his being always king, that they thought it strange that he endured
life. Who is unhappy at only having one mouth? And who is not unhappy at
having only one eye? Probably no man ever ventured to mourn at not having
three eyes. But any one is inconsolable at having none.
410. Perseus, King of
Macedon.—Paulus Aemilius reproached Perseus for not killing himself.
411. Notwithstanding the sight
of all our miseries, which press upon us and take us by the throat, we have
an instinct which we cannot repress and which lifts us up.
412. There is internal war in
man between reason and the passions.
If he had only reason without
passions...
If he had only passions
without reason...
But having both, he cannot be
without strife, being unable to be at peace with the one without being at war
with the other. Thus he is always divided against and opposed to himself.
413. This internal war of reason
against the passions has made a division of those who would have peace into
two sects. The first would renounce their passions and become gods; the
others would renounce reason and become brute beasts. (Des Barreaux.) But
neither can do so, and reason still remains, to condemn the vileness and
injustice of the passions and to trouble the repose of those who abandon
themselves to them; and the passions keep always alive in those who would
renounce them.
414. Men are so necessarily
mad that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness.
415. The nature of man may be
viewed in two ways: the one according to its end, and then he is great and
incomparable; the other according to the multitude, just as we judge of the
nature of the horse and the dog, popularly, by seeing its fleetness, et
animum arcendi; and then man is abject and vile. These are the two ways which
make us judge of him differently and which occasion such disputes among
philosophers. For one denies the assumption of the other. One says, “He is
not born for this end, for all his actions are repugnant to it.” The other
says, “He forsakes his end, when he does these base actions.”
416. For Port-Royal. Greatness
and wretchedness.—Wretchedness being deduced from greatness, and greatness
from wretchedness, some have inferred man’s wretchedness all the more because
they have taken his greatness as a proof of it, and others have inferred his
greatness with all the more force, because they have inferred it from his
very wretchedness. All that the one party has been able to say in proof of
his greatness has only served as an argument of his wretchedness to the
others, because the greater our fall, the more wretched we are, and vice
versa. The one party is brought back to the other in an endless circle, it
being certain that, in proportion as men possess light, they discover both
the greatness and the wretchedness of man. In a word, man knows that he is
wretched. He is therefore wretched, because be is so; but he is really great
because he knows it.
417. This twofold nature of
man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls. A single
subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden variations from unmeasured
presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart.
418. It is dangerous to make
man see too clearly his equality with the brutes without showing him his
greatness. It is also dangerous to make his see his greatness too clearly,
apart from his vileness. It is still more dangerous to leave him in ignorance
of both. But it is very advantageous to show him both. Man must not think
that he is on a level either with the brutes or with the angels, nor must he
be ignorant of both sides of his nature; but he must know both.
419. I will not allow man to
depend upon himself, or upon another, to the end that, being without a
resting-place and without repose.
420. If he exalt himself, I
humble him; if he humble himself, I exalt him; and I always contradict him,
till he understands that he is an incomprehensible monster.
421. I blame equally those who
choose to praise man, those who choose to blame him, and those who choose to
amuse themselves; and I can only approve of those who seek with lamentation.
422. It is good to be tired
and wearied by the vain search after the true good, that we may stretch out
our arms to the Redeemer.
423. Contraries. After having
shown the vileness and the greatness of man.—Let man now know his value. Let
him love himself, for there is in him a nature capable of good; but let him
not for this reason love the vileness which is in him. Let him despise
himself, for this capacity is barren; but let him not therefore despise this
natural capacity. Let him hate himself, let him love himself; he has within
him the capacity of knowing the truth and of being happy, but he possesses no
truth, either constant or satisfactory.
I would then lead man to the
desire of finding truth; to be free from passions, and ready to follow it
where he may find it, knowing how much his knowledge is obscured by the
passions. I would, indeed, that he should hate in himself the lust which
determined his will by itself so that it may not blind him in making his
choice, and may not hinder him when he has chosen.
424. All
these contradictions, which seem most to keep me from the knowledge of
religion, have led me most quickly to the true one.
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