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Blaise Pascal
Pensées
The translation is that
of W. F. Trotter (William Finlayson) and was published in New York by Harvard
Classics, 1909-1914.
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contents page]
SECTION V
JUSTICE AND THE REASON OF EFFECTS
291. In the letter On
Injustice can come the ridiculousness of the law that the elder gets all. “My
friend, you were born on this side of the mountain, it is therefore just that
your elder brother gets everything.”
“Why do you kill me”?
292. He lives on the other
side of the water.
293. “Why do you kill me?
What! do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this
side, my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you
in this manner. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is
just.”
294. On what shall man found
the order of the world which he would govern? Shall it be on the caprice of
each individual? What confusion! Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of
it.
Certainly, had he known it, he
would not have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain
among men, that each should follow the custom of his own country. The glory
of true equity would have brought all nations under subjection, and legislators
would not have taken as their model the fancies and caprice of Persians and
Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We would have seen it set up in
all the States on earth and in all times; whereas we see neither justice nor
injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. Three
degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth.
Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession; right has its
epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion marks to us the origin of such and
such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this
side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.
Men admit that justice does
not consist in these customs, but that it resides in natural laws, common to
every country. They would certainly maintain it obstinately, if reckless
chance which has distributed human laws had encountered even one which was
universal; but the farce is that the caprice of men has so many vagaries that
there is no such law.
Theft, incest, infanticide,
parricide, have all had a place among virtuous actions. Can anything be more
ridiculous than that a man should have the right to kill me because he lives
on the other side of the water, and because his ruler has a quarrel with
mine, though I have none with him?
Doubtless there are natural
laws; but good reason once corrupted has corrupted all. Nihil amplius nostrum
est; quod nostrum dicimus, artis est.39 Ex senatus—consultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur.40(2) Ut olim vitiis, sic nunc
legibus laboramus.41(3)
39 Cicero, De finibus, V. 21.
“There is no longer anything which is ours; what I call ours is
conventional.”
40(2) Seneca, Epistles, xcv. “It
is by virtue of senatus-consultes and plebiscites that one commits crimes.”
41(3) Tacitus, Annals, iii. 25.
“Once we suffered from our vices; today we suffer from our laws.”
The result of this confusion
is that one affirms the essence of justice to be the authority of the
legislator; another, the interest of the sovereign; another, present custom,
and this is the most sure. Nothing, according to reason alone, is just
itself; all changes with time. Custom creates the whole of equity, for the
simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its
authority; whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it. Nothing
is so faulty as those laws which correct faults. He who obeys them because
they are just obeys a justice which is imaginary and not the essence of law;
it is quite self-contained, it is law and nothing more. He who will examine
its motive will find it so feeble and so trifling that, if he be not
accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he will marvel
that one century has gained for it so much pomp and reverence. The art of
opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding
them even to their source, to point out their want of authority and justice.
We must, it is said, get back to the natural and fundamental laws of the
State, which an unjust custom has abolished. It is a game certain to result
in the loss of all; nothing will be just on the balance. Yet people readily
lend their ear to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as soon as they
recognise it; and the great profit by their ruin and by that of these curious
investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake men sometimes
think they can justly do everything which is not without an example. That is
why the wisest of legislators said that it was necessary to deceive men for
their own good; and another, a good politician, Cum veritatem qua liberetur
ignoret, expedit quod fallatur.42 We must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once introduced
without reason, and has become reasonable. We must make it regarded as
authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if we do not wish that it
should soon come to an end.
42 Saint Augustine, City of God,
iv. 27. “As he has ignored the truth which frees, it is right he is mistaken.”
295. Mine, thine.—“This dog is
mine,” said those poor children; “that is my place in the sun.” Here is the
beginning and the image of the usurpation of all the earth.
296. When the question for
consideration is whether we ought to make war and kill so many men—condemn so
many Spaniards to death—only one man is judge, and he is an interested party.
There should be a third, who is disinterested.
297. Veri juris.43 — We have it no more; if we
had it, we should take conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of
justice. It is here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.
43 Cicero, De officiis, iii, 17.
“Concerning true law.”
298. Justice, might.—It is
right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is
strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might is helpless; might without
justice is tyrannical. Justice without might is gainsaid, because there are
always offenders; might without justice is condemned. We must then combine
justice and might and, for this end, make what is just strong, or what is
strong just.
Justice is subject to dispute;
might is easily recognised and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to
justice, because might has gainsaid justice and has declared that it is she
herself who is just. And thus, being unable to make what is just strong, we
have made what is strong just.
299. The only universal rules
are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs and of the majority in
others. Whence comes this? From the might which is in them. Hence it comes
that kings, who have power of a different kind, do not follow the majority of
their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is
just; but, being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just
to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might; so
that the just and the strong should unite, and there should be peace, which
is the sovereign good.
300. “When a strong man armed
keepeth his goods, his goods are in peace.”
301. Why do we follow the
majority? Is it because they have more reason? No, because they have more
power.
Why do we follow the ancient
laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they
are unique and remove from us the root of difference.
302. ... It is the effect of
might, not of custom. For those who are capable of originality are few; the
greater number will only follow and refuse glory to those inventors who seek
it by their inventions. And if these are obstinate in their wish to obtain
glory and despise those who do not invent, the latter will call them
ridiculous names and will beat them with a stick. Let no one, then, boast of
his subtlety, or let him keep his complacency to himself.
303. Might is the sovereign of
the world, and not opinion. But opinion makes use of might. It is might that
makes opinion. Gentleness is beautiful in our opinion. Why? Because he who
will dance on a rope will be alone, and I win gather a stronger mob of people
who will say that it is unbecoming.
304. The cords which bind the
respect of men to each other are in general cords of necessity; for there
must be different degrees, all men wishing to rule, and not all being able to
do so, but some being able.
Let us, then, imagine we see
society in the process of formation. Men will doubtless fight till the
stronger party overcomes the weaker, and a dominant party is established. But
when this is once determined, the masters, who do not desire the continuation
of strife, then decree that the power which is in their hands shall be
transmitted as they please. Some place it in election by the people, others
in hereditary succession, etc.
And this is the point where
imagination begins to play its part. Till now power makes fact; now power is
sustained by imagination in a certain party, in France in the nobility, in
Switzerland in the burgesses, etc.
These cords which bind the
respect of men to such and such an individual are therefore the cords of
imagination.
305. The Swiss are offended by
being called gentlemen, and prove themselves true plebeians in order to be
thought worthy of great office.
306. As duchies, kingships,
and magistracies are real and necessary, because might rules all, they exist
everywhere and always. But since only caprice makes such and such a one a
ruler, the principle is not constant, but subject to variation, etc.
307. The chancellor is grave
and clothed with ornaments, for his position is unreal. Not so the king; he
has power and has nothing to do with the imagination. Judges, physicians,
etc., appeal only to the imagination.
308. The habit of seeing kings
accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and all the paraphernalia which
mechanically inspire respect and awe, makes their countenance, when sometimes
seen alone without these accompaniments, impress respect and awe on their
subjects; because we cannot separate in thought their persons from the
surroundings with which we see them usually joined. And the world, which
knows not that this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by
a natural force, whence come these words, “The character of Divinity is
stamped on his countenance,” etc.
309. Justice.—As custom
determines what is agreeable, so also does it determine justice.
310. King and tyrant.—I, too,
will keep my thoughts secret.
I will take care on every
journey.
Greatness of establishment,
respect for establishment.
The pleasure of the great is
the power to make people happy.
The property of riches is to
be given liberally.
The property of each thing
must be sought. The property of power is to protect.
When force attacks humbug,
when a private soldier takes the square cap off a first president, and throws
it out of the window.
311. The government founded on
opinion and imagination reigns for some time, and this government is pleasant
and voluntary; that founded on might lasts for ever. Thus opinion is the
queen of the world, but might is its tyrant.
312. Justice is what is
established; and thus all our established laws will necessarily be regarded
as just without examination, since they are established.
313. Sound opinions of the
people.—Civil wars are the greatest of evils. They are inevitable, if we wish
to reward desert; for all will say they are deserving. The evil we have to
fear from a fool who succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so
sure.
314. God has created all for
Himself. He has bestowed upon Himself the power of pain and pleasure.
You can apply it to God, or to
yourself. If to God, the Gospel is the rule. If to yourself, you will take
the place of God. As God is surrounded by persons full of charity, who ask of
Him the blessings of charity that are in His power, so... recognise, then,
and learn that you are only a king of lust, and take the ways of lust.
315. The reason of effects.—It
is wonderful that men would not have me honour a man clothed in brocade and
followed by seven or eight lackeys! Why! He will have me thrashed, if I do
not salute him. This custom is a farce. It is the same with a horse in fine
trappings in comparison with another! Montaigne is a fool not to see what
difference there is, to wonder at our finding any, and to ask the reason.
“Indeed,” says he, “how comes it,” etc....
316. Sound opinions of the
people.—To be spruce is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great
number of people work for one. It shows by one’s hair, that one has a valet,
a perfumer, etc., by one’s band, thread, lace,... etc. Now it is not merely
superficial nor merely outward show to have many arms at command. The more arms
one has, the more powerful one is. To be spruce is to show one’s power.
317. Deference means, “Put
yourself to inconvenience.” This is apparently silly, but is quite right. For
it is to say, “I would indeed put myself to inconvenience if you required it,
since indeed I do so when it is of no service to you.” Deference further
serves to distinguish the great. Now if deference was displayed by sitting in
an arm-chair, we should show deference to everybody, and so no distinction
would be made; but, being put to inconvenience, we distinguish very well.
318. He has four lackeys.
319. How rightly do we
distinguish men by external appearances rather than by internal qualities!
Which of us two shall have precedence? Who will give place to the other? The
least clever. But I am as clever as he. We should have to fight over this. He
has four lackeys, and I have only one. This can be seen; we have only to
count. It falls to me to yield, and I am a fool if I contest the matter. By
this means we are at peace, which is the greatest of boons.
320. The most unreasonable
things in the world become most reasonable, because of the unruliness of men.
What is less reasonable than to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule a
State? We do not choose as captain of a ship the passenger who is of the best
family.
This law would be absurd and
unjust; but, because men are so themselves and always will be so, it becomes
reasonable and just. For whom will men choose, as the most virtuous and able?
We at once come to blows, as each claims to be the most virtuous and able.
Let us then attach this quality to something indisputable. This is the king’s
eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better,
for civil war is the greatest of evils.
321. Children are astonished
to see their comrades respected.
322. To be of noble birth is a
great advantage. In eighteen years it places a man within the select circle,
known and respected, as another have merited in fifty years. It is a gain of
thirty years without trouble.
323. What is the Ego?
Suppose a man puts himself at
a window to see those who pass by. If I pass by, can I say that he placed
himself there to see me? No; for he does not think of me in particular. But
does he who loves someone on account of beauty really love that person? No;
for the small-pox, which will kill beauty without killing the person, will
cause him to love her no more.
And if one loves me for my
judgement, memory, he does not love me, for I can lose these qualities
without losing myself. Where, then, is this Ego, if it be neither in the body
nor in the soul? And how love the body or the soul, except for these
qualities which do not constitute me, since they are perishable? For it is
impossible and would be unjust to love the soul of a person in the abstract
and whatever qualities might be therein. We never, then, love a person, but
only qualities.
Let us, then, jeer no more at
those who are honoured on account of rank and office; for we love a person
only on account of borrowed qualities.
324. The people have very
sound opinions, for example:
1. In having preferred
diversion and hunting to poetry. The half-learned laugh at it, and glory in
being above the folly of the world; but the people are right for a reason
which these do not fathom.
2. In having distinguished men
by external marks, as birth or wealth. The world again exults in showing how
unreasonable this is; but it is very reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant
king.
3. In being offended at a
blow, or in desiring glory so much. But it is very desirable on account of
the other essential goods which are joined to it; and a man who has received
a blow, without resenting it, is overwhelmed with taunts and indignities.
4. In working for the
uncertain; in sailing on the sea; in walking over a plank.
325. Montaigne is wrong.
Custom should be followed only because it is custom, and not because it is
reasonable or just. But people follow it for this sole reason, that they
think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no longer, although it were the
custom; for they will only submit to reason or justice. Custom without this
would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of reason and justice is no more
tyrannical than that of desire. They are principles natural to man.
It would, therefore, be right
to obey laws and customs, because they are laws; but we should know that
there is neither truth nor justice to introduce into them, that we know
nothing of these, and so must follow what is accepted. By this means we would
never depart from them. But people cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they
believe that truth can be found, and that it exists in law and custom, they
believe them and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not
simply of their authority apart from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are
liable to revolt when these are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown
of all, looked at from a certain aspect.
326. Injustice.—It is
dangerous to tell the people that the laws are unjust; for they obey them
only because they think them just. Therefore it is necessary to tell them at
the same time that they must obey them because they are laws, just as they
must obey superiors, not because they are just, but because they are
superiors. In this way all sedition is prevented, if this can be made intelligible
and it be understood what is the proper definition of justice.
327. The world is a good judge
of things, for it is in natural ignorance, which is man’s true state. The
sciences have two extremes which meet. The first is the pure natural
ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth. The other extreme is
that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all that men can
know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from
which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of
itself. Those between the two, who have departed from natural ignorance and
not been able to reach the other, have some smattering of this vain knowledge
and pretend to be wise. These trouble the world and are bad judges of
everything. The people and the wise constitute the world; these despise it,
and are despised. They judge badly of everything, and the world judges
rightly of them.
328. The reason of
effects.—Continual alternation of pro and con.
We have, then, shown that man
is foolish, by the estimation he makes of things which are not essential; and
all these opinions are destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions
are very sound and that thus, since all these vanities are well founded, the
people are not so foolish as is said. And so we have destroyed the opinion
which destroyed that of the people.
But we must now destroy this
last proposition and show that it remains always true that the people are
foolish, though their opinions are sound because they do not perceive the
truth where it is, and, as they place it where it is not, their opinions are
always very false and very unsound.
329. The reason of
effects.—The weakness of man is the reason why so many things are considered
fine, as to be good at playing the lute. It is only an evil because of our
weakness.
330. The power of kings is
founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their
folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for
its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure; for there is nothing
more sure than this, that the people will be weak. What is based on sound
reason is very ill-founded as the estimate of wisdom.
331. We can only think of
Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like
others, laughing with their friends, and, when they diverted themselves with
writing their Laws and the Politics, they did it as an amusement. That part
of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious; the most philosophic
was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was as if
laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; and if they presented the appearance
of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to
whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into
their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as
possible.
332. Tyranny consists in the
desire of universal power beyond its scope.
There are different assemblies
of the strong, the fair, the sensible, the pious, in which each man rules at
home, not elsewhere. And sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair
foolishly fight as to who shall be master, for their mastery is of different
kinds. They do not understand one another, and their fault is the desire to
rule everywhere. Nothing can effect this, not even might, which is of no use
in the kingdom of the wise, and is only mistress of external actions.
Tyranny-... So these
expressions are false and tyrannical: “I am fair, therefore I must be feared.
I am strong, therefore I must be loved. I am...
Tyranny is the wish to have in
one way what can only be had in another. We render different duties to
different merits; the duty of love to the pleasant; the duty of fear to the
strong; duty of belief to the learned.
We must render these duties;
it is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to ask others. And so it is false and
tyrannical to say, “He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is
not able, therefore I will not fear him.”
333. Have you never seen
people who, in order to complain of the little fuss you make about them,
parade before you the example of great men who esteem them? In answer I reply
to them, “Show me the merit whereby you have charmed these persons, and I
also will esteem you.”
334. The reason of
effects.—Lust and force are the source of all our actions; lust causes
voluntary actions, force involuntary ones.
335. The reason of effects.—It
is, then, true to say that all the world is under a delusion; for, although
the opinions of the people are sound, they are not so as conceived by them,
since they think the truth to be where it is not. Truth is indeed in their
opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. Thus it is true that we
must honour noblemen, but not because noble birth is real superiority, etc.
336. The reason of effects.—We
must keep our thought secret, and judge everything by it, while talking like
the people.
337. The reason of effects.
Degrees. The people honour persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise
them, saying that birth is not a personal, but a chance superiority. The
learned honour them, not for popular reasons, but for secret reasons. Devout
persons, who have more zeal than knowledge, despise them, in spite of that
consideration which makes them honoured by the learned, because they judge
them by a new light which piety gives them. But perfect Christians honour
them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and
against, according to the light one has.
338. True Christians,
nevertheless, comply with folly, not because they respect folly, but the
command of God, who for the punishment of men has made them subject to these
follies. Omnis creatura subjecta est vanitati.44 Liberabitur.45(2) Thus Saint Thomas explains
the passage in Saint James on giving place to the rich, that, if they do it
not in the sight of God, they depart from the command of religion.
44 Eccles. 3. 19. “for all is
vanity.”
45(2) Rom. 8. 20-21. “It shall
be delivered.”
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