St. Thomas Aquinas on Predestination and Invincible Ignorance

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St. Thomas Aquinas maintained a doctrine of predestination, according to which “invincible ignorance”-- that ignorance in which some reside in which it is impossible for them to come to a belief in the Catholic Faith -- is an adequate means to contribute to the accomplishment of the purpose of the universe, which is the manifestation of the goodness of God.

How We shall Approach the Question.

To properly understand the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas regarding invincible ignorance, we have to place it within the context of his teaching regarding:

i) The finality of creation, that is, the purpose for which the universe exists, and the universal cosmological principles that this purpose entails;

ii) How that purpose is achieved, that is, the origin and execution of the universe which is in accordance with this purpose and these universal principles.

Only then can we properly understand the cosmological and teleological place of invincible ignorance from the Thomist perspective.

All quotes from the Summa Theologica will be taken from the Benziger Brothers edition of 1947, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province and available on the internet at http://www.newadvent.org/summa.

The End of the Universe and Invincible Ignorance.

So let us begin by considering the finality of creation. We shall see: i) the purpose of the universe and the universal cosmological principles that purpose entails; ii) then how these principles apply to men; and iii) how this all inform us as to the place of invincible ignorance.

So, what is the purpose of the universe? God freely created the universe to manifest His goodness as far as possible, as we shall see in a moment.

And what cosmological principles does this entail? Firstly, since His goodness cannot be present simply in the creature, it is necessary that He produce a variety of creatures, each of which represents the divine goodness in some way; thereby what is lacking in the manifestation of His goodness in one creature, might be present in another:

“Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.” (Summa Theologica 1, 47, 1)

So God is concerned primarily with the perfection of the universe as a whole, in which His goodness is represented better by a variety.

Further it is necessary for the perfection of the varied universe that there be an inequality in creatures, which is caused by God, so that the unequal creatures might variously manifest the goodness of God:

“Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things. It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another.” (1, 47, 2)

Moreover, in order that the perfection of the universe be achieved, that a variety of unequal things manifest complexly the simple goodness of God, it is also necessary that some things fail in their good, so that there be all grades of goodness, including those that fail in their good:

“The perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness.” (1, 48, 2)

And it is necessary for the perfection of the universe that some things fail in their good, also so that some other goods may be, which would otherwise not be possible. Hence God allows certain creatures to fail in their good for the perfection of the whole:

“God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above. And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says; but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says, “God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil.” Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.” (1, 48, 2)

So, we have seen the purpose of the universe, namely that it manifest the goodness of God as far as possible; and we have seen the universal cosmological principles that this purpose entails, namely that there be a variety of unequal creatures, some of which fail in their end. We shall now consider how this purpose and these principles apply to men.

Men, too, are part of the creation, and are therefore subject to the same purpose and the same universal cosmological principles as the rest of the universe. Men exist to manifest the goodness of God. And so it is that men must variously exist as a part of the universe, with inequalities of grade of being, that the goodness of God might be variously and adequately manifested in and through them. Likewise, it is necessary that some men fail in their good, that the perfection of the varied universe may be achieved. These are the reasons for the predestination and reprobation of men.

God both predestines and reprobates men for the purpose of the completion of the universe, which is the manifestation of His goodness. That goodness is variously manifested in men as the presence of the good of His mercy and the good of His avenging justice. His goodness would not be manifested as far as it could be, if there were only the good of His mercy present in the fate of men; His goodness is manifested better in the variety afforded by the presence also of the good of His avenging justice. Thus it is required for the perfection of the universe, that it might manifest His goodness in the full variety which it contains, that some men obtain their end in salvation. And it is likewise required that others fail to attain to their end, and are rather damned; for otherwise the good of His avenging justice could not be realised, if some men did not die in their sins. This is the cosmological purpose of the salvation of the elect and of the damnation of the reprobate. The universe and anything that it contains is not for nothing, but is for the manifestation of God’s goodness. The universe is universally and ultimately purposeful. So, God predestines some men to an high grade of being, as saints in Heaven; and these achieve their end, which is eternal happiness in the vision of God. And others He reprobates unto a low grade of being, as the damned; these fail to obtain their end. In the variety of the universe, His goodness is manifest.

So, God allows certain men to fail to obtain salvation. Some He predestines to salvation, others He reprobates unto damnation. And this He does for the purpose for which the universe exists:

“The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above. Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rm. 9:22,23): “What if God, willing to show His wrath (that is, the vengeance of His justice), and to make His power known, endured with much patience (allowed) vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory”; and (2 Tim. 2:20): “But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor.”” (1, 23, 5)

So, it is necessary for the completion of the universe, that it might more perfectly manifest the goodness of God, for which purpose it exists, that there be a variety of men, of different grades, some of whom fail to obtain their good, which is salvation. Therefore, it is necessary that God divide mankind into the elect, who obtain their good, in whom shall be realised the goodness of His mercy; and into the reprobate, who fail to obtain their good, in whom the goodness of His avenging justice is realised. Thus is realised the variety of the higher and the lower grades of man, the honourable and the dishonourable; and His goodness is manifested variously and more perfectly than it otherwise would be.

Hence, both salvation and damnation are logically prior in the order of intention to election and to predestination and reprobation. God first intends the purpose of the universe, namely that it might manifest His goodness as far as is possible. Therefore He intends that there should be salvation and damnation, so that His goodness might be variously and thereby more perfectly manifested. Therefore He elects some, whom He predestines to salvation, and the good of His mercy is manifested in these, as St. Thomas says, in that He “spares” them the fate of the reprobate. And others He reprobates, in whom is manifested the good of His avenging justice. God first decides the end and then decides the adequate means to that end, namely predestination and reprobation, the ultimate end being the same for either, namely the manifestation of the divine goodness.

God wishes to realise His wrath as well as His mercy, and there is no injustice in this of God as He deprives no creature of what it is due. The Apostle explains:

“As it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy. […] O man, who art thou that repliest against God? […] What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction?” (Romans 9:13-15, 20, 22)

So, we have seen the purpose of the universe, the universal principles that this entails, and how these apply to men. We shall now consider the place of invincible ignorance within this cosmological and teleological context.

As we have seen, it is necessary for the completion of the universe that some men fail in their end and are damned. Now, invincible ignorance is precisely an instance of men failing to obtain their good, which failure must be for the completion of the universe to be effected. If no men failed to obtain their end, which is salvation, or died in their sins, then the goodness of God’s avenging justice would not be manifested in their damnation; and then the universe as a whole would not manifest His goodness as far as it could in the required variety. So it must be that some men are damned - and invincible ignorance is an adequate means to this end. For, all men are conceived with original sin, which suffices for their damnation, as suffice the mortal sins which many men commit. That these people are damned, it is not required that they resist the Faith with a positive sin of infidelity; rather it is adequate that they never hear of the Faith, in which consists their invincible ignorance, without which Faith their sins, which suffice for damnation, cannot be taken away. Wherefore, those who die invincibly ignorant are damned.

So, invincible ignorance, by which men fail to obtain their end, is an adequate means toward the completion of the purpose of the universe; it is an adequate means for the damnation of the reprobate, without which damnation and the variety that it affords, the goodness of God could not be manifested as perfectly as it can be. It is of teleological and cosmological adequacy, one might say, contributing to the completion of the purposeful universe. It is an adequate means to the end, and means there must be, if the end is to be achieved. Hence such ignorance is not a purely negative thing; for although it is in itself negative and permits the failure of the individual creature, nevertheless its ultimate effect is to afford the realisation of the goodness of the avenging justice of God and thereby the success of the entire universe. It is purposeful. It contributes to the universal good, being a means thereto. God is concerned with the universal good, for which it is required that some creatures fail in attaining to their end, so that the universe might attain to its end, which is God alone.

“Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation--to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation--to another, by reason of God’s mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom ‘all things work together unto good’ (Romans 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.” (1, 2, 79, 4)

“The everlasting punishments of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is [preserved] which is acceptable to God for its own sake.” (Supplement 99, 1; translation corrected in brackets)

God is able to bring good out of evil, and indeed must do if all manner of good is to be realised; therefore He allows some men to die invincibly ignorant and to be damned.

Again, there is no injustice in this with God, for no creature has merited or is due the preaching of the Gospel or the opportunity to be saved, which opportunity is wholly gratuitous and is not rendered to any man as due. Rather, before men are brought to the Faith, without which sins cannot be taken away, they are due only damnation due to original sin and mortal sins. The saved are not chosen, or even given an opportunity to be saved, but purely through grace. They are saved only because God wishes to realise His mercy in them, even as He realises His wrath in the damned. It is all to the glory of His goodness. He deprives no creature of its due, whether He saves or damns. No one can complain. God does what He does because He is good, that is, in order to manifest His goodness in various ways, and it is not unlawful for Him to do as He chooses so as to manifest His goodness. Each shall receive as God freely ordains, and there is no injustice in this with God. If He wishes to leave some men without the hearing of the gospel then that is His business. Those who are saved will see these matters clearly, and they will see the gratuity of the grace that they have received, clearly in the fate of the damned, that none may glory but in God alone.

And indeed St. Thomas explained that those who die invincibly ignorant, who have heard nothing about the Faith through no fault of their own (except for the fault of original sin, which is in them as their own, as was defined at Trent, and for which they have an ignorance of divine matters), are damned for their sins, including original sin, which cannot be taken away without the Faith; thus they fail to obtain their end, God not preventing this by sending them a missionary:

“Unbelief has a double sense. First, it can be taken purely negatively; thus a man is called an unbeliever solely because he does not possess faith. Secondly, by way of opposition to faith; thus when a man refuses to hear of the faith or even contemns it, according to Isaiah, “Who has believed our report?” This is where the full nature of unbelief, properly speaking is found, and where the sin lies.

“If, however, unbelief be taken just negatively, as in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of fault, but of penalty, because their ignorance of divine things is the result of the sin of our first parents. Those who are unbelievers in this sense are condemned on account of other sins, which cannot be forgiven without faith; they are not condemned for the sin of unbelief.” (2, 2, 10, 1)

This is the place of invincible ignorance, from the teleological and cosmological perspective of Thomism. Far from being a problem for Thomists, invincible ignorance is an adequate means towards the completion of the universe in the manifestation of the goodness of God.

And we may take the analysis a step further, by further applying the same cosmological principles. There are various ways in which a man may fail to obtain salvation: by never hearing the Faith; by hearing it but refusing it; by believing it but not persevering in it; by persevering in it but not in justice. All of these ways contribute that there might be a variety of guilt with which men die, some with original sin only, some with mortal sins only, some with both, some with mortal sins of resisting the Faith, some without. Thus there shall be all various unequal grades of being: of the various honourable angels and saints, with their varied glory; and of the various dishonourable devils and reprobate men, some with this guilt and punishment, some with that. Thus the varied perfection of the universe is realised in the various goods.

Saint Ephraim Syrius (A. D. 372), doctor of the Church: “The wretched souls of the damned are distributed throughout places of punishment according to the nature of their sins, fearfully or less fearfully, as it is written: “each one is bound fast by the ropes of his own sins” (Proverbs 5:22); and this is what is meant by the servant who is “beaten with few stripes” (Luke 12:48). For just as there are differences of sin, so there are differences of punishment.” (Sermon 72)

“For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father with his angels: and then will he render to every man according to his works.” (St. Matthew 16:27)

Further, the invincibly ignorant shall be mercifully spared the greater guilt perchance had by those who fall into sin while having known the Faith or who resist the Faith; for as St. Thomas teaches, God shows His mercy in what He spares the creature (1, 23, 5). And thereby the goodness of His mercy may also be realised through invincible ignorance in their lesser punishment. For God exhibits His mercy even in the damned:

“For if, flying from the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they be again entangled in them and overcome: their latter state is become unto them worse than the former. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them.” (II St. Peter 2:20-22)

“Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.” (1, 21, 4)

So, invincible ignorance is an adequate means to the completion of the varied universe, that there be some who are damned, and that there be some who are damned without a positive sin of infidelity of refusing to receive or to remain in the Faith. All are conceived with original sin (except Our Lord and Our Lady), which suffices for damnation, and with no title to salvation or to receive the preaching of the Gospel. God permits certain men to fail to obtain happiness and the final forgiveness of their sins, these through invincible ignorance and those through stubbornness, so that the variety of creatures may manifest His goodness more perfectly than any single one could. This is the significance of invincible ignorance; as said St. Thomas:

“And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this.” (1, 48, 2)

This is the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas regarding invincible ignorance.

The Providence of the Divine Intellect and Invincible Ignorance.

So, we have considered invincible ignorance within the context of the end, the purpose, of the universe. We shall now consider it within the context of the origin and accomplishment of this universe; this we shall do first with regard to the Divine Intellect and then to the Divine Will, for the universe has its origin and accomplishment in these.

We shall first consider: i) the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect; ii) then how the universal cosmological principles, which we have seen entailed by the purpose of the universe, affect this origin and accomplishment; iii) how this applies to men; iv) how this informs us as to the place of invincible ignorance.

So, how does the universe have its origin in the Divine Intellect? It has its origin therein because the ideas of all things composing the universe, according to which they are brought into existence, eternally exist within the Mind of God, which is the cause of things when joined with His Will:

“It must necessarily be held that ideas [in God] are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches. […] Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it,” from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many.” (1, 15, 2)

“Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.” The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. […] Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the “knowledge of approbation.”” (1, 14, 8)

Further, there exists in the Divine Mind, not only the idea of each thing in universal, as forms, but also the particular idea of each individual thing. All of the universe, each creature comprising it, is brought into existence in accordance with these ideas, as God’s Knowledge is the cause of all things:

“Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on, the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.” (1, 14, 11)

These ideas of all things have their origin as God’s self-knowledge of His Essence as capable of being participated in by creatures in various degrees. Thus it is that the universe, in its ideational origin, contains all the various grades of being needed to perfect the universe. A causative idea of each individual creature pre-exists, with the grade of being it is to have. Thus it is that the universe will adequately manifest the goodness of God in its variety.

“Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.” (1, 15, 2)

So, the universe eternally pre-exists in the Divine Mind, which is its cause, as the many ideas of the various and unequal individual creatures, according to which they are all brought into existence and have their being. That is how the universe has its origin in the Divine Intellect. Now, how does the universe have its accomplishment in the same?

The universe has its accomplishment in the Divine Intellect in that the path of each creature ideationally pre-exists therein. The universe is not static, nor the individuals within it, but rather they have a movement towards, or away from, their respective perfections and goods, in the accomplishment of which they variously manifest the goodness of God. But the universe pre-exists in the Mind of God, which is its cause. Hence, the path according to which a creature is moved pre-exists in the Divine Mind; and together they comprise the type of the direction of the creature to its end. Together the pre-existent types of the journey of all creatures, comprise the pre-existent type of the unfolding history and completion of the universe. This pre-existing typical history, according to which each creature is directed to its end, is the divine providence:

“Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above. But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists.” (1, 23, 4)

“In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness. This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before, it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. […] Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself or to others. […] Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that “Providence is the divine type [pre-existent plan] itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things”: which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. […] Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government.” (1, 22, 1 and 3)

So, the accomplishment of the universe pre-exists in the Divine Mind, which is the cause of the universe, as the divine providence.

Now, how do the universal cosmological principles which we have seen entailed by the purpose of the universe affect the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect? We have seen that it is necessary for the accomplishment of the universe, that there be a variety of unequal creatures some of whom fail to obtain their end. So it is necessary that some creatures so fail in the accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect, which is the divine providence.

Divine Providence is an universal providence, and is concerned with the good of the universe as a whole, for which some things must fail; it is not a particular providence, which is concerned chiefly with the good of the particular thing. God preconceives all creatures as together variously participating in His goodness, such as that the perfection of the whole universe may be achieved through the various unequal grades of being it contains, including those grades which fail to attain their end. Thus in the pre-existent typical history of the universe which guides the whole to its completion through all its parts, some individual creatures are preconceived as failing to reach their end, that the universe might thereby be perfected in the various unequal grades, which include those which fail to attain their end.

“It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe.” (1, 22, 2)

Thus, every path which pre-exists in God, by which creatures are directed, is intended to guide the universe as a whole toward its end, be it through a creature attaining or falling from its end.

“In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches.” (1, 15, 2)

So providence includes the universal plan, the type, according to which some creatures fail in the attainment of their end. This is how the universal cosmological principles entailed by the purpose of the universe affect the accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect.

Now, how does this apply to men? Man is a creature, like the rest, and his existence and good thus depends upon the Divine Mind, in which he has his origin and accomplishment. Man too is subject to the divine providence, in which all things are preordained:

“We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. […] For God alone can change the will, as shown above. Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): “If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his [meaning but correct] his tongue.”” (1, 116, 1; translation corrected in brackets)

As providence guides creatures to their ends, it includes the plan according to which men are guided to their end, which is eternal salvation. This is divine predestination, which is a part of the divine providence in their regard:

“It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above. Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said. […] Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason [plan] of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.” (1, 23, 1)

So men, as all creatures, are subject to the divine providence, which is the pre-existent type in the Divine Mind, which is their cause, according to which they are directed to their end, which for men is eternal happiness.

However, as we have seen, because the purpose of the universe entails that some creatures fail to obtain their end, the accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect involves that some creatures are not directed to their end. Therefore the divine providence, which is an universal providence, involves that some men shall not be directed to their end, in the ideational plan which is the cause of the universe. Thereby the universe as a whole is directed to its end, with the goodness of avenging justice, which could not be if some men did not fail to attain salvation. That God does not direct certain men to their end, but allows them to fail, in His causative foreknowledge, is called divine reprobation, which is a part of the divine universal providence, as is predestination.

“God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation.” (1, 22, 2)

“God does reprobate some. For it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above. Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above. Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (1, 23, 3)

So, the perfection of the universe in all its variety is the chief object of the divine providence, which is thus a universal providence. This providence pre-exists in the Divine Mind, as the typical history of all things, according to which the end of the universe is accomplished. And it is accomplished by means of the divine government, which is the implementation of the plan according to which all things are preordained. This plan includes that some men, indeed certain men, fail to obtain salvation and are damned, and accordingly this infallibly comes to pass. Their damnation ideationally and eternally pre-exists as part of the preconceived perfect universe. Thereby the universe is directed to its end, so as to include the good of avenging justice. For some creatures, and some men, must fail in their end, if the universe is to be accomplished with all of the goods that it can contain, of which avenging justice is one. This is how the affect, upon the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Mind, of the principles entailed in the purpose of the universe, applies to men.

Now, men are not predestined because of any foreseen merits or because God foresees that the man will cooperate with His grace if He gives it to him. Rather, all goods which a man uses and all the free actions that he makes to attain salvation, are foreordained by God in the ideational plan of the completion of the universe according to which he is directed to his end. A man merits and obtains salvation only because God has foreordained that he do so. God first gratuitously intends that a man should be saved, so that the end of the universe may be accomplished, and then He providentially ordains all the means of the salvation and glorification of the man, including his merits for which He shall reward salvation.

“And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that he will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was shown above. Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination.” (1, 23, 5)

“So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation.” (1, 23, 8)

For God in His providence does not gratuitously give only the preaching of the Gospel, but also gratuitously gives the efficacious grace by which the will is infallibly moved to embrace the Faith. Thereby the man is directed toward salvation. The act of the will is wholly the effect of God and wholly the effect of the will which is subordinate to God.

“For God alone can change the will, as shown above. Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate.” (1, 116, 1)

“Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: “Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God”; and Lam. 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.”” (1, 2, 109, 6)

“Man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that “by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.” Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.”” (1, 2, 112, 3)

“But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence.” (1, 22, 2)

“Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” (1, 23, 5)

The human will is infallibly moved by God in such a way as that its freedom is established and maintained for the building up of the universe, which requires all grades of being, including the voluntary. God is the transcendent First Cause of all being, including every act and every mode of an act; He is the First Cause Himself Unmoved, without which there is no act.

“Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.” (1, 83, 1)

“For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. […] Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills.” (1, 19, 8)

So, free human acts are subject to the divine providence, to fate, according to which they are preordained. And everything that in any way contributes to a man’s salvation is predestined, including that he hear the Gospel and that he freely embrace its message. Thus it is that men are not predestined because of foreseen merits.

And neither is reprobation given because of foreseen demerits, but rather God first intends that a man should be damned, for the completion of the universe, then He permits the sins which are the means of his damnation. He could efficaciously prevent any man from sinning, and a man sins only because God permits him to; so the man’s sin cannot be the reason why He permits it. Nor is the original sin the ultimate reason for reprobation, as God could have prevented that too; He allowed it as it is an adequate means toward the damnation of men. The sole reason for reprobation is the good of the universe in the various manifestation of the goodness of God, for which the good of avenging justice requires that some men die in sin; as we have seen:

“Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (1, 23, 3)

Some He freely predestines to direct to their end; others freely He reprobates so that they shall fail to obtain their end; and thereby the universe is be built up.

So, we have seen the origin and completion of the universe in the Intellect of God, in which eternally exists the divine and universal providence which is the cause of the universe; we have seen how this is affected by the purpose of the universe; and we have seen how this all applies to men. Now, how does this inform us as to the place of invincible ignorance?

That some die invincibly ignorant of the Catholic Faith and are inevitably damned, is not a theological problem, but is rather “a part of providence”, which allows some things to fall away from their end, so that the universe may be guided to its perfection in all of its variety. The falling away from their end of the damned, indeed of the invincibly ignorant damned, and their eternal just and good punishment, typically and eternally pre-exist in the Divine Mind, as the plan according to which their history is executed and the completion of the universe is accomplished. Certain men are damned through invincible ignorance because they eternally and ideationally pre-existed as such in the Divine Mind for the completion of the universe. God could prevent the damnation of the invincibly ignorant: He could send them a missionary in His providence; and He could predestine the efficacious grace by which a man infallibly accepts the Faith. There is no one whom He could not convert to the embracing of the Faith by His efficacious grace.

“From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.” (1, 19, 8)

“If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto.” (1, 2, 10, 4)

There is no one so hardened in infidelity and a false religion that God could not convert him to the Faith. Grace is resisted only if God wills to permit that; and it is infallibly and freely accepted if God should simply will that it be so. God can reach anyone with a missionary, and He can convert anyone to the Faith regardless of their condition. Indeed, a man will only be influenced by infidelity if God permits that to happen: all circumstances are preordained.

But it pertains to His universal providence to allow certain men to fail in their end, He not preventing this. He could save them, but this is excluded by the purpose of the universe, with which He is chiefly concerned and for which He brought them into existence and to their fate. On the other hand it is not necessary for the completion of the universe that each person have an opportunity to embrace the Faith or that there be no invincible ignorance; rather, as we have seen, invincible ignorance is an adequate means of the accomplishment of the universe.

This is the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas regarding invincible ignorance.

We may note, that it makes no sense to ask, why ‘this man’ is predestinate and ‘this man’ is reprobate or invincibly ignorant. Each man, as each creature, is one of the possibilities foreseen by God whereby He might manifest His goodness in a certain way, that there might be all manner of goodness in the universe. His history, everything about him, was preordained as such a possibility. He is that typical possibility actualised, in every detail of himself. And so it is nonsensical to ask why he is invincibly ignorant or that and that, for otherwise it would not be ‘him’, but some other possibility actualised. There is an approbative necessity to invincible ignorance. One may enquire why God actualised that possibility: and the answer is, as we have seen, that thereby the completion of the universe was accomplished, the perfection of which is the chief end of the parts. The end of the universe is God alone, and that is sufficient purpose.

The Love of the Divine Will and Invincible Ignorance.

We have considered invincible ignorance within the context of the end of the universe and within the context of the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect. We shall now consider it within the context of the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Will.

We shall consider: i) first how the universe has its origin in the Divine Will; ii) how the Divine Will is affected by the universal cosmological principles entailed by the purpose of the universe which God freely wills, and how this effects the accomplishment of the universe; iii) how this affects men; iv) how this informs us as to the place of invincible ignorance.

So, how does the universe have its origin in God’s Will. God freely wills things outside of Himself in so far as He wishes to share His goodness with them, or more precisely with the universe which they comprise, which He has also foreknown, that His goodness might be spread abroad as far as possible:

“God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.” (1, 19, 2)

The Divine Will to manifest His goodness as far as possible in the completion of the universe, is the cause of other things, as is His Intellect by which He foresees creatures as participating in His goodness in various ways such as to perfect the universe. Both His Intellect and His Will are the cause of the perfect universe: “We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.” (1, 19, 4) Thus, whatever God wills (simply) takes place, just as does anything which God foreknows: “The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. [...] Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect.” (1, 19, 6) Just as the universe ideationally pre-exists in the Mind of God, even so it intentionally pre-exists in His Will.

So, God’s Will that a creature should have a particular good, which is His love for it, is the cause of all goodness had by each creature, including its existence and any perfections it has:

“God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.” (1, 20, 2)

That is how the universe has its origin in the Will of God, which is its cause. Now, how do the universal cosmological principles entailed in the purpose of the universe affect the accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Will?

We have seen that it is entailed in the purpose of the universe that there be a variety of unequal creatures of unequal grades. Thereby His goodness is manifested better than it would otherwise be. So, as He wills the end, He wills the means. He wills the existence and goodness of creatures in so far as they contribute to the perfection of the universe, so that His goodness might be spread abroad as far as possible: accordingly He does not will the same goods to all creatures but rather a variety of goods; therein He does not love them to the same extent. Thus God’s unequal Love for creatures is the cause of the unequal and varied goodness of creatures, as He does not will the same good to all creatures, but various goods, to some higher, to others lower. Just as He preconceives the inequality of creatures, so He wills it. If God wills a creature a good then that creature infallibly has that good, as His Will is the cause of things; and if He does not will a creature a particular good, then that creature does not have that good. In this way He produces the varied universe, with creatures of unequal grades of being, that it might adequately manifest His goodness.

“Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” (1, 20, 4)

Further, it is entailed in the purpose of the universe, that the goodness of God be manifest as far as is possible, that some of which fail to obtain their end: and consequently God does not will that each creature attains to its end, but only that some do. To some He wills that they have the good of attaining to their end and these infallibly do so. To others He does not will that they attain their end; He wills to permit them to fail, which they infallibly do.

“Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above. But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists.” (1, 23, 4)

As we have seen, God directs creatures to their end in His universal providence; and, in His approbative preconception, He has conceived some creatures as failing to obtain their end, that thereby the universe might be perfected in its end. Now, God will, in His providence, direct a creature to its end only if He wills that particular creature the good of the attainment of its end. His preconception and His love are in perfect accordance and indeed are One in the Divine Simplicity, and both are operative in the divine and universal providence.

“Providence resides in the intellect, but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. […] Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above.” (1, 22, 1)

God does not will that all creatures attain their end: therefore they do not. That is how the universal cosmological principles entailed in the purpose of the universe which God freely intends, affect the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Will. He wills the end, and wills the means toward that end.

So, how does this affect men? It affects their salvation.

Like all other creatures, men only attain to their end if God wills them that good. This is called His predilection, His ‘pre-love’ one might say, toward those who are elect (chosen) in so far as God wills them rather than the reprobate this particular good. If He wills a man salvation, then He wills him also the means of salvation in His providence according to which He will infallibly direct them to their end. His predilection is the cause of His predestination, as is His foreknowledge:

“Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above. But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above:---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.” (1, 23, 4)

Hence whatever directs a man to salvation is of predilection. Whatever good a man has is due solely to the love that God has for him. As God loves him, so a man has. For the will of God is the cause of all goodness whatsoever had by any creature, as we have seen. This is true regarding both the beginning, continuation and the end of our Faith.

So, if a man receives the preaching of the Faith, then that is a good which God wishes him in His love. And likewise the love of God is the cause of a man freely accepting the Faith; for it is a good to accept the Faith, and any good had by any creature is due to God’s efficacious Will. He who freely accepts the Faith is therein better than he who does not, yet no creature is better than another other than by the Will of God, which is the cause of all good; as we have seen:

“Now it has been shown above that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. […] For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” (1, 20, 2 and 4)

Because God wills a man the good of accepting the Faith, He eternally decrees an infallible, efficacious grace by which he will freely accept it. Accordingly, there can be no one whom God could not convert to the Faith. No condition of any man could prevent the efficacy of divine grace. Indeed, a man only has a condition if God wills or wills to permit that that be so. All conditions of all things are preordained, as we have seen, by infallible decrees, and the preordination is not determined by the conditions of things but vice versa. God’s Will is not determined by the creature, but the creature by the Divine Will. God’s Will is not determined to permit a defect or a failure of a creature by that creature’s defect or failure; rather, the creature has whatever defects and failures that God wills to permit for the greater good of the universe. He does not permit because of creaturely defect; rather there is defect because He permits. There is no alternative: God determining or determined. The Thomist cannot allow any passivity (receptivity of change) in God who is Pure Actuality, who Is, who is Pure Perfection and who cannot be perfected by any creature, neither as to His Will nor His Knowledge, which are One in the Divine Simplicity. All that exists does so because God forewills and foresees it. Thereby the world is foreordained, predetermined. Hence the world cannot determine God or thwart His designs.

And just as it is true that the beginning of our Faith is from the divine predilection, so likewise is the continuation of our Faith and justice. We may consider this in two respects; i) as to the continuance in the performance of just works, and ii) as to the continuance in justification itself which depends on avoiding grave sin. In both of these ways, the just are dependent on the continued gratuitous favour of God, His predilection.

Just as efficacious grace is required for conversion to the Faith, it is likewise needed for the performance of just works. The indwelling grace of justification only contributes to an inherent potentiality, a power, a mere possibility. That which is potential cannot actualise itself into an act, for which actualisation an act is required; nor can that which is not in motion move itself to motion (act), for which a motion is required. Hence, a creaturely will which is not in motion cannot move itself to motion, to an act; nor can the power (potentiality) for virtue, provided by justifying grace, residing in the soul actualise itself into a virtuous act of the soul. A determining premotion is required by all creatures for all acts, from the First Mover Himself Unmoved who is transcendently the cause of all being, of each entity, be it a substance or a voluntary act or whatever. He is Pure Actuality, in whom there is no admixture of potentiality or passivity, and He is transcendently the First Mover of any creaturely acts whatsoever. There is no motion, no act, of which He is not the First Mover, the First Actor. He is the Universal First Cause. When God preordains a man to make a good act, He eternally decrees a premotion, which moves him to freely determine himself to perform the specified act. In the supernatural order, that premotion is called efficacious grace and it is wholly gratuitous and cannot be merited. Only the potential to good, which lies in justifying grace, can be merited through just works; and hence as the Council of Trent says, just works merit an increase in justifying grace, which pertains to the potential to do further good. However, justification does not entitle the just to the performance of good acts. Just works themselves cannot be merited: they can only be performed, and that only if God gratuitously moves the just to perform them. No potentiality is actualised, nor is any faculty operative, without God’s decree that it should be so. Justifying grace can be merited; efficacious grace cannot.

The just will only perform just works: i) if God gives him an assistance, even guiding and guarding him, which assistance also contributes to the possibility to do good but not give the act; ii) and if God moves him to do good with an efficacious grace which is in addition to the ‘merely sufficient’ grace of justification which gives the operative power, the potentiality.

“Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever. But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured. And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.” (1, 2, 109, 2)

“As stated above, in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act. Now with regard to the first kind of help, [justified] man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another [the second aforementioned] way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason---the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves “the law of sin,” (Rm. 7:25.) In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rm. 8:26): “We know not what we should pray for as we ought”; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: “For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: “Lead us not into temptation," and "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven,” and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.” (1, 2, 109, 9)

The divine and gratuitous favour, His predilection, is also required for the continuation of the just in the state of justification, which involves him avoiding grave sin. The assistance that contributes to the mere possibility of perseverance in grace, will always be given so long as a man is not himself wanting to the grace of justification through sin, as said Trent (Denz. 806); however it is up to God whether He, having given justifying grace and assistance, nevertheless allows a man to defect to malice and moves him to the entity of the act of sin, whereby the man is himself wanting to God’s justifying grace. Justifying grace and assistance only give a potentiality to the perseverance in grace, but not its actuality. The actual preservation (conservation) in grace cannot be merited any more than can the just act be merited; only an increase in the potential to good, i.e., an increase in justifying grace, can be merited. Justification does not entitle the just to the actual continuation in good. Justification pertains only to power, not to act and continuation, which are only gratuitously given. Hence, God can permit the justified to defect to malice and move him to sin, whereby he falls from grace, even as He can move the guilty to justice. The man has then had the power to persevere but he has not done so. As we have seen, God’s gratuitous predilection is the basis of any good had by any creature. Without God gratuitously maintaining the creature in good, it cannot continue therein. The creature, as a creature, is of itself detectible and will inevitably defect without the divine predilection which is the source of all being and all good. So should God not will that a man continue in justice or in virtuous dispositions, then he does not so continue, whatever operative power he had to do so. The just defects to malice as soon as God wills to permit him to. And then God moves him to freely determine himself to the entity of a sinful act. It is still then the man, the creature, who is himself wanting to sanctifying grace, in his defection to malice; indeed, of himself and without the divine predilection, he cannot but be wanting. Further, God’s permission of a defection to malice and His premovement to the entity of the sinful act do not exclude that an act be voluntary, but is rather the condition of a voluntary and sinful act being at all. The just who commits grave sin is therein wanting to God’s justifying grace and to the divine guarding assistance, which have given him the power and the possibility -but not the actuality - to remain in good; God then withdraws justifying grace in punishment for the free and malicious act.

“To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.” (1, 2, 109, 2)

Our final perseverance in righteousness is likewise from God and entails the same. God either permits the just to defect or moves him to righteousness. It is up to Him.

“We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time---that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby “whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).” (2, 2, 24, 11)

“Augustine says (De Persev. ii): “Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving it?” Now perseverance is besought by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say “Hallowed be Thy name,” which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.” (1, 2, 109, 10)

So God can save whomsoever He wills to, infallibly sustaining, moving, guiding and guarding them - infallibly converting them to grace and infallibly preserving them therein. But that His goodness be spread abroad as far as possible, it is necessary that there be a variety of creatures, some of which fail to obtain their end. Therefore God does not will that all men obtain their end, which is salvation. Rather He wills to permit some to fall away and to be damned, so that His goodness might be manifested more perfectly in the variety of the universe. He may be said to antecedently will the salvation of each in so far as that is a good absolutely considered, logically prior to any regard to any other consideration; but He does not consequently will the salvation of each, logically subsequent to His consideration of the greater good of the entire universe toward which He aims. Only what God consequently wills, that is, what He simply wills, takes place, as His providence is universal as we have seen.

“The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. [...] Thirdly, according to Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. [...] To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. [...] Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. […] Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.” (1, 19, 6)

God consequently or simply wills only such to be saved as He has ordained according to the “counsel of His Will”, that is, according to His consideration of the greater good and how it can be achieved, unto the manifestation of His goodness as far as possible in the universe, which is His purpose for acting, and for which some must be lost.

So, as the perfection of the universe entails that some creatures fall away from their end, God does not simply will that all men attain to the good of salvation, any more than He preconceives all men as participating in His goodness in that way:

“God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobate them.” (1, 23, 3)

Rather He wills to allow certain men to fall away, so that His goodness might be manifest also by the good of His avenging justice:

“Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above. Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” (1, 23, 3)

“Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.” (1, 23, 5)

Hence, as we have seen above, men are not predestined according to any foreseen merits or because God foresees that the man will cooperate with His grace if He gives it to him. Rather all goods which a man uses and all the free actions he makes to attain his end – and all merits which he accumulates - are because God wills them and preconceives them. As He wills them the good of salvation, He wills them the means of salvation, which He also preconceives. There is no difference between one man and another prior to God’s arbitrary predestination:

“Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: “Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?” (Mt. 20:14,15).” (1, 23, 5)

We may note that St. Thomas’ statement that predestination has “no reason except the divine will” appears to represent the position of St. Augustine whose interpretation of St. Paul he faithfully followed:

“Therefore mercy and judgment were manifested in the very wills themselves. Certainly such an election is of grace, not at all of merits. For he had before said, “So, therefore, even at this present time, the remnant has been saved by the election of grace. And if by grace, now it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace.” Therefore the election obtained what it obtained gratuitously; there preceded none of those things which they might first give, and it should be given to them again. He saved them for nothing.” (The Predestination of the Saints 11)

And, that a man is reprobate is not due to foreseen demerits, but rather his demerits, be they original or voluntary, are ordained by an infallible permissive decree, that he might be justly damned and the good of God’s avenging justice might be realised. God could save him and foreordain the means of salvation and merits for him, but He does not wish to, as He wills a greater good.

It is a matter like unto having lots drawn for one, as to who is saved and who is damned; all is worked according to fate:

“In whom we also are called by lot [Latin: ‘sorte’, which also means ‘by fate’], being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all.” (Ephesians 1:11)

So, this is how men are affected by the purpose of the universe which God freely intends: God wills to allow some to fall away. Now, how does this inform us as to the place of invincible ignorance?

That some men do not hear of the Faith, and thus are inevitably damned, is because God does not will them the particular goods of the hearing of the Faith, nor of believing it when hearing it, nor of salvation. If He did, then they would most certainly receive them. Rather, He wills to allow them to fall away from their end, not hearing the Faith and not being saved, so that He may manifest His goodness in their damnation; by this damnation the perfection of the universe is accomplished, which must include the variety afforded by the good of avenging justice. He both preconceives and wills to permit their invincible ignorance, that He may damn them as such. It is an adequate means, as we have seen, for the completion of the universe, of the greater good which is willed by God.

This is the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas, as interpreted by the Thomists, regarding invincible ignorance.

Conclusion.

We have considered invincible ignorance within the context of the purpose of the universe and within the context of the origin and accomplishment of the universe in the Divine Intellect and Will. And we have found that said ignorance is not a problem from the perspective of Thomism.

Rather, it is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the universe, which is that the goodness of God be spread abroad and manifest as far as possible, that there be all grades of being, and that some creatures fail to obtain their end, including some men their salvation. Toward this end, God preconceives the universe in a typical history, according to which He governs the completion of the universe in His universal providence, which allows certain creatures to fall from their end, and some men to be damned through invincible ignorance. And toward that same end, He wills to permit certain creatures to fall from their end, and certain men to be damned through invincible ignorance, not willing that they receive the hearing of the Gospel, without which they cannot be saved; He could convert and preserve anyone in justice, but some He does not wish to. Therefore this infallibly comes to pass. Invincible ignorance is not a theological problem but is rather an adequate means toward the accomplishment of the varied universe affording: the damnation of men and avenging justice; and that there might be a full variety of guilt and of avenging justice; and that mercy may be manifest in the damnation of the invincibly ignorant for that they do not have the guilt of resisting the Faith and are spared a greater damnation. That is the cosmological and teleological place of said ignorance, from the perspective of Thomism.

The Angelic Doctor